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STATE OF MAINE
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
1 STATE HOUSE STATION
AUGUSTA, MAINE
04333-0001
JOHN ELIAS BALDACCI
GOVERNOR

JOHN M. KERRY
DIRECTOR
OFFICE OF ENERGY
INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY

Dear Governor Baldacci,
As you noted in the 2007 Governor’s Office of Energy Independence Comprehensive Energy Plan
brochure, “Our nation, region and state have become dangerously dependent on unreliable, insecure and expensive
foreign oil and natural gas. Combustion of these fossil fuels causes climate change, damages the environment,
threatens public health, undermines our economic vitality, erodes national security and diminishes our quality of
life.” As all energy prices rise to historic heights in 2008 and as benchmark crude oil trades at over $135 barrel on
the New York Mercantile Exchange, these stark energy, environmental and economic realities have dramatically
increased the vulnerability of Maine citizens. As you know, as a result of Maine’s continuing dependence on
expensive and unreliable foreign fossil fuels for heating our homes, energizing our businesses and fueling our cars,
trucks, trains and boats, Maine exports billions of dollars out of the state each year and is increasingly becoming
more vulnerable to rapid price escalations, fossil fuel supply curtailments and infrastructure disruptions.
As you have noted on many occasions, the state must reduce its acute dependence on foreign fossil fuels,
while providing the vision and the leadership in the development of public/private partnerships that will enhance the
State of Maine’s goals of achieving energy security and independence with clean, reliable, affordable, sustainable,
indigenous renewable resources. While the state’s comprehensive energy plan identifies the principles,
organizational framework and concrete steps necessary to advance your vision for an energy independent and secure
state, it is clear that there is a need for the state to identify the magnitude and scope of our energy resources; the
strengths and weaknesses of our energy infrastructures; and the potential threats to all interrelated energy supply and
distribution systems.
Accordingly, the Governor’s Office of Energy Independence and Security, in collaboration with the Maine
Emergency Management System and the Energy Resources Council is pleased to transmit to you the 2008-2009
State of Maine’s Energy Emergency Management Plan. The purpose of the Plan is to provide the Governor, the
Legislature, the Executive Departments, the energy industry and the general public with a clear understanding of the
strengths and weaknesses of the states public and private capacities and plans to address a potential or actual energy
emergency caused by a supply disruption or a rapidly and unsustainable increase in energy prices.
Respectfully submitted,

John M. Kerry,
Director, Governors Office of Energy Independence and Security

PHONE: (207) 287-3292

IAN.BURNES@MAINE.GOV

FA X: (207) 287-8927
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State of Maine Energy Emergency Management Plan
Governor’s Office of Energy Independence and Security
Facilitating Public and Private Partnerships

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The primary purpose of this comprehensive and inte‐
grated State Energy Emergency Management Plan is
to provide the Governor, the Legislature, the local
governments, the public utilities, the private energy
industry and energy consumers with a clear under‐
standing of the state’s plans, processes, priorities,
programs, personnel and timeframes to address the
critical energy emergency issues of the 21st Century.
In addition to identifying the state’s energy re‐
Accordingly, the Governor’s Office of Energy Inde‐
sources, infrastructure and the designated state agen‐
pendence and Security, in collaboration with other
cies authorized to prepare for and address an acute
state agencies and private sector organizations, is
energy emergency, this emergency management plan
committed to advancing the principles, programs
identifies the critical public and private entities en‐
and the comprehensive and integrated plans neces‐
gaged in the energy industry at the international, re‐
sary to secure a safe, clean and affordable energy fu‐ gional, state and local levels of activity. Many of
ture. To accomplish these goals, it is essential that we these public and private organizations are not only
responsible for assisting the state in an energy emer‐
enter into a public‐private partnership with energy
gency; they are directly responsible for the produc‐
distributors and consumers to clearly identify the
strengths and weaknesses or our energy supply, stor‐ tion, management, transmission and distribution of
many of our energy products and services in the state
age, transmission and distribution infrastructures.
and region.
Our nation, region and state have become danger‐
ously dependent on unreliable, insecure and expen‐
sive foreign fossil fuel products. The wasteful and
increasing combustion of foreign fossil fuel products
contributes to environmental pollution and climate
change, undermines our economic vitality, erodes
our public health and diminishes the quality of life
for all Maine citizens.

ENERGY HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION: provides a description of the various conditions that are monitored
during the pre‐emergency phase of an energy crisis. This section also explains that the seriousness of a
situation will depend on the context and may be affected by factors such as the weather, geo‐political
events, world energy markets, availability of energy resources, event duration and infrastructure disrup‐
tions.

TASK FORCE MODEL: provides an overview of how the state established a task force model for planning
for and assessing energy hazards and planning appropriate state level responses to pending or actual en‐
ergy emergencies. This model contemplates a seamless and well‐coordinated collaboration with the Maine
Emergency Management Agency, the state agency specifically identified and authorized to conduct a re‐
sponse to an actual or perceived energy emergency. This section identifies various public agencies and pri‐
vate entities that might be asked to serve on an energy task force and some of the contemplated activities
they might engage in as task force members.

TRANSITION FROM PREPAREDNESS TO RESPONSE ACTIVITIES: provides a brief analysis of the different
forms and dimensions of energy emergencies. This section defines an “Energy Emergency” and the role
this plan plays in facilitating the state and private industry’s response to a pending or real energy emer‐
gency.

MAINE’S ENERGY RESOURCES AND FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THEIR VULNERABILITY : provides
an overview of Maine’s energy resources, its infrastructure and its known vulnerabilities. This section de‐
scribes the international and regional energy markets involved in providing, transmitting and distributing
Maine’s energy resources. It also provides an overview of the regional factors that influence Maine energy
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
security and reliability, especially Maine’s vulnerability to sudden price spikes and rapid curtailment of en‐
ergy supplies.

ENERGY EMERGENCY PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE: this section clearly identifies the Gover‐
nor’s Office of Energy Independence and Security, working in close collaboration with the Maine Emergency
Management Agency and the Energy Resources Council, as the state agency directly responsible for the devel‐
opment and maintenance of the State of Maine Energy Emergency Management Plan. It describes the seam‐
less transition from the energy pre‐emergency planning phase, coordinated by the OEIS, to the energy emer‐
gency response phase, coordinated by MEMA. It specifies that the OEIS, in collaboration with the MEMA and
the ERC, will update the Maine Energy Emergency Management Plan every two years.

ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE AND INDUSTRY CONTACTS: identifies critical energy infrastructure (security
screened) and key public officials/offices and private energy industry contacts throughout the state and re‐
gion.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVING MAINE’S ENERGY PREPAREDNESS: this section provides recommenda‐
tions on how Maine can enhance its energy security and preparedness, while reducing its vulnerability to ex‐
pensive, environmentally damaging and insecure imported fossil fuels.

Acknowledgements:
The Governor’s Office of Energy Independence and Security extends its thanks to Ian Burnes, Betsy Elder, Lynette
Miller, Joseph Sucaskas, Pat Hart, of Hart Associates, and the various members of the Energy Resources Council that
contributed to development of this plan.
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STATE OF MAINE ENERGY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN
INTRODUCTION: PREPAREDNESS IS KEY
mation and subject‐matter experts both from
within the state and from neighboring jurisdic‐
energy supply disruption or price spike may be
tions are available to support decision makers
sudden and unexpected, or it may evolve so
gradually that people can assess the situation and before and during an energy emergency.
prepare. The seriousness of an energy emergency
depends on factors such as the acuteness and du‐ Energy emergencies requiring immediate public
ration of the event and availability of energy al‐ and private responses, such as those resulting
ternatives. Ultimately, the Governor has consid‐ from natural disasters or terrorism, are directly
erable discretion, under Title 37‐B. MRSA§742, in addressed by the Maine Emergency Management
Agency under the more general emergency re‐
deciding whether an energy emergency exists
sponse plans for those types of emergencies. In
and how to
such cases,
intervene.
however, the
preparedness
Because
framework
government
described
it is not al‐
above would
ways able to
provide deter‐
prevent an
mine whether
emergency,
additional ac‐
the pre‐
tions for man‐
response, or
aging the en‐
prepared‐
ergy aspects of
ness phase,
a more generic
of planning
emergency
is particu‐
would be
larly impor‐
needed.
tant. The State of Maine Energy Emergency Man‐

An energy emergency can take many forms. An

agement Plan has an Energy Task Force (ETF)
structure. This ETF structure musters personnel
and analytical resources to enable the Governor’s
Office of Energy Independence and Security, the
Maine Emergency Management Agency, and the
Energy Resources Council (ERC) to plan for and
respond to a potential or actual energy emer‐
gency. It coordinates actions of critical public and
private resources and ensures that current infor‐

This plan is divided into two sections. The first
lays out Maine’s energy emergency management
structure—the agencies and their responsibilities
and relationships. The second examines each of
Maine’s major energy sectors and highlights con‐
siderations for managing an emergency in one or
more of them.

I. MAINE HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
For the purposes of this plan, an energy hazard is
any combination of factors or conditions that can
result in:
♦ Physical shortage. A shortage or curtailment
in the necessary supply of energy resources,
such as liquid heating and transportation fu‐
els, natural gas, or electricity, or
♦ Price shock. An unexpected or radical in‐
crease in the price of energy resources.

off workers and delay filling orders and satisfy‐
ing contractual commitments.

Energy hazards and potential emergency situa‐
tions can result from:
♦ Short‐term crises. Unexpected events can dra‐
matically impact the supply and availability
of resources (e.g. an ice storm can damage
electric transmission facilities).
♦ Cumulative impacts of an unfortunate se‐
According to statute, an energy emergency situa‐
quence of events. Over a longer time period,
tion exists when an actual or impending acute
where unfolding events can culminate in a
shortage in energy
hazard or emer‐
M aine Energy Consumption by Source, 2005
resources threatens
gency (e.g. a cold
the health, safety, or
snap increases
Coal
Other
welfare of the citi‐
heating oil de‐
1%
Natural Gas
3%
12%
zens of the state
mand at a time
Biomass
24%
(Title 37‐B MRSA).
when supplies in
See Appendix A for
storage are al‐
the statutory defini‐
ready low, and
tion of an energy
then a storm re‐
emergency and a de‐
stricts transporta‐
scription of the Gov‐
tion and impedes
Hydroelectric
ernor’s emergency
new deliveries).
Pow er
powers when an en‐
♦ Chronic condi‐
8%
Petroleum
ergy emergency is
tions. An energy
52%
declared.
hazard can be a
chronic condition
Figure
1.
Energy
Consumption
by
source
(EIA)
An unexpected or
or exacerbated by
radical increase in the price of an energy resource
chronic conditions (e.g. over‐reliance on a
is not necessarily an energy emergency as de‐
particular type of energy resource, inadequate
fined by law. This plan addresses price shocks as
energy infrastructure, or inefficient use of
potential emergencies, however, for two reasons.
available energy resources).
First, sharp price fluctuations can be indicators of
supply disruptions. Second, in some situations
This plan provides guidance on short‐term crises
policy makers and the public may perceive price and emergencies that unfold due to unfortunate
shocks as emergencies. If some citizens are un‐
sequences of events. In contrast, chronic condi‐
able to purchase energy when prices suddenly
tions can and should be addressed through miti‐
rise, their health and safety may be in jeopardy.
gation, such as policies to increase energy effi‐
In addition, energy price spikes may put busi‐
ciency and resource diversity; but such actions
nesses at risk by forcing them to temporarily lay are beyond the scope of this plan.
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I.MAINE
HAZARD
A.EXAMPLES OF CAUSES OF
IDENTIFICATION ENERGY EMERGENCIES
(continued)

Weather, world events, and

♦

industry conditions are
among the factors that can bring on energy emer‐
♦
gencies.
Examples of how weather or climate could influ‐
ence energy supply and delivery infrastructure:
♦ Severe winter cold increases demand for heat‐
ing fuels at the same time that Portland Har‐
bor and Penobscot Bay are iced in, delaying or
inhibiting terminal deliveries.
The winter conditions also delay
heating oil delivery trucks.
♦ A winter storm causes a tanker
or large ship to hit a bridge in
Portland Harbor, disabling both
the bridge and tanker and spill‐
ing oil.
♦ A natural disaster such as a
Katrina‐scale hurricane or an ice
storm destroys or damages en‐
ergy supply and delivery infra‐
structure.
♦ High demand for one fuel results in price in‐
creases, leading to unanticipated demand for
another type of fuel.
♦ High summer gasoline drives continued re‐
finery production of gasoline and delayed
production of home heating oil; then cold
weather creates demand for home heating oil
before inventories are built.

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦
♦

Examples of how world events could affect
Maine’s energy interests:
♦ OPEC intentionally reduces volumes of crude
pumped to keep prices high for crude and re‐ ♦
fined petroleum products.
♦ Terrorist acts or acts of war destroy U.S. en‐
ergy infrastructure or supply, or slow deliver‐

ies to key Northeast ports due to safety con‐
cerns.
Anti‐U.S. political acts, such as the 1970s oil
embargo or 9/11‐type terrorism, cripple the
U.S. economy.
Supply disruptions overseas result in spot
market fluctuations and volatile prices for
U.S. consumers.
War in a region of the oil‐rich Middle East
causes geopolitical unrest and restricts global
trade in petroleum products.
A pandemic of bird flu causes all forms of
economic activity in cities along the
eastern seaboard to slow down, cre‐
ating re‐supply problems for the pe‐
troleum‐dependent Northeast.
♦ A prolonged Canadian railroad
strike continues on the winter day a
TEPPCO pipeline ruptures. Ninety
percent of Maine’s propane supply
is delayed.
Examples of industry conditions
and physical interruptions in sup‐
ply:
Unexpected refinery outages delay just‐in‐
time production and/or delivery of fuels at a
time when storage levels are already low.
Unusually low storage levels for natural gas
lead to volatile prices and fuel switching to
avoid shortages.
Increased demand for winter fuels delays re‐
finery production of gasoline.
Multiple Gulf Coast and Florida hurricanes
damage oil production and refining infra‐
structure so severely that it is off‐line for
months to recover and rebuild.
A TEPPCO pipeline ruptures during a pro‐
longed Canadian railroad strike and the cold‐
est, snowiest part of the winter. Ninety per‐
cent of Maine’s propane supply is delayed.
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I.MAINE
HAZARD
B. SPECIAL PROBLEMS WITH
IDENTIFICATION
ENERGY EMERGENCIES

♦

Public assistance programs and shelters may
already be used at capacity. Services such as
(continued)
Energy events differ from other
outreach to the elderly and those with special
types of disasters in fundamen‐
needs may not be available in all areas.
♦ Isolated individuals may need outreach and
tal ways.
♦ Energy emergencies may develop slowly and
transportation to and from their homes.
impact some groups more than others.
♦ An energy supply or price event may develop C. CASCADING EFFECTS
slowly; effects may seem to be scattered but
Hazard‐analysis methodology for emergency
they accumulate over time.
planning requires preparation for “cascading ef‐
♦ Energy events may not be regarded as emer‐
fects,” hazards brought about by other emer‐
gency events. The ETF framework can accommo‐
gencies but as economic or personal prob‐
lems, so there may be less urgency about pre‐ date cascading effects by virtue of its flexibility: it
includes any entity with expertise relevant to the
paring for a possible crisis.
♦ Energy price increases may disproportion‐
energy hazards at hand.
ately affect the most vulnerable segments of
society. Those living in remote areas are vul‐ Although an energy emergency would not neces‐
nerable, as are the elderly on fixed incomes
sarily result in other emergency conditions or
and people living in poverty.
vice versa (such as when an earthquake causes a
♦ There is no single responsible agency in en‐
gas‐line breach or an ice storm causes an electri‐
ergy emergency response; many agencies and cal outage), there may be more subtle connec‐
tions. For example:
organizations require coordination.
♦ Energy events may not prompt disaster relief; ♦ A prolonged period of energy shortage could
victims may need to rely on existing assis‐
result in increased crime (e.g. looting during
tance programs and insurance coverage, if ap‐
electric outages).
♦ A prolonged period of electricity outage
plicable.
♦ Many volunteer organizations lack proce‐
could affect transportation because of an in‐
dures for responding to energy emergencies;
ability to pump gasoline.
they may also lack criteria for evaluating re‐
♦ A prolonged period of electricity outage
quests for assistance.
could hinder the re‐supply of refined petro‐
♦ Victims might neither seek assistance (out of
leum products because the racks will not op‐
embarrassment or unfamiliarity with assis‐
erate without electricity.
tance procedures, or because local officials are ♦ High heating‐fuel prices or shortages could
unequipped to help) nor automatically re‐
bring reliance on firewood; shortages of dry
ceive assistance.
firewood encourage more burning of green
wood, increasing the incidence of catastrophic
♦ Different jurisdictions may use different crite‐
fires.
ria for granting assistance.
♦ An energy event may stress assistance pro‐
♦ Electricity outages could increase reliance on
grams. Programs may not be available in all
in‐home generators; generators used without
areas; redirection of community resources
proper ventilation pose safety risks.
may be necessary.
♦ Prolonged energy disruptions could result in
9

I.MAINE
HAZARD
telecommunications outages, E. ENERGY MARKETS ARE REGIONAL, GLOBAL,
IDENTIFICATION leaving people uninformed AND INTERDEPENDENT
(continued)

about shelters for themselves Maine participates in regional and global markets
and their pets.
for petroleum products and natural gas, and re‐
gional markets for electricity. An understanding
of the movement and storage of energy supplies
D. INTERDEPENDENCIES
Hazard‐analysis methodology for emergency
for international markets and the region is neces‐
planning also requires an examination of
sary for understanding the vulnerability of en‐
“interdependencies,” how an energy emergency ergy supplies in Maine. Interrelationships exist at
will manifest in random other ways as disrup‐
and among all levels of the various energy mar‐
tions to security, safety, and comfort, with possi‐ kets. For example:
ble catastrophic results. “Interdependency” refers ♦ Disruptions in natural gas supply may cause
electric generation plants or large industrial
to the mutual functional reliance of essential ser‐
customers to switch to oil—the same type of
vices—namely networked utility services—on
oil used for residential home heating.
other networks, utilities, services, or auxiliary
non‐utility systems. Interdependency can exist
♦ An ever‐increasing percentage of the region’s
with or without physical interconnection. For
electric generation is fueled by natural gas; a
utilities, key classes of interdependency are
disruption in natural gas supplies or delivery
physical, cyber, geographical, and institutional.
infrastructure could result in electricity short‐
♦ Because gasoline pumps use electricity, a pro‐
ages.
longed electricity outage could leave essential ♦ High gasoline demand could result in de‐
layed refinery production of home heating oil;
service vehicles without fuel.
♦ A prolonged period of electricity outage
delayed production could mean lower inven‐
could hinder the re‐supply of refined petro‐
tory levels.
leum products because the racks will not op‐ ♦ Drought may result in reduced hydro‐
erate without electricity.
electricity production, resulting in increased
♦ A prolonged period of electricity outage
production of electricity from fossil‐fired gen‐
would hinder telecommunications, SCADA
eration and increased demand for fossil fuels.
systems, water pumping utilities, and the
Federal Aviation Administration.
The interdependencies among utility sectors are
growing more numerous and significant. For ex‐
Network outage would have a profound effect on ample:
infrastructure protection and many critical ser‐
♦ Electric generation is increasingly dependent
vices, including electric and communication sys‐
on the availability and deliverability of natu‐
tems, healthcare, national defense, financial mar‐
ral gas.
kets, shipping and manufacturing, law enforce‐
♦ Telecommunications systems rely on electric‐
ment, and security for ports and international
ity to run.
1
borders.
♦ Electric industry communications rely on tele‐
communications infrastructure.
Some industrial and commercial users have dual‐
capacity energy systems.
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I.MAINE
HAZARD
IDENTIFICATION

F. INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY
(continued)
Energy infrastructure is vul‐
nerable not only to natural
disasters but to deliberate
assault. Increasing dependence on the internet
for energy industry communications and dis‐
patch increases vul‐
nerability to cyber‐
attack. Energy infra‐
structure is also
prone to physical
attack, given numer‐
ous sources of pub‐
lic information on its
location and impor‐
tance and the acces‐
sibility of energy fa‐
cilities to the public.

Energy secu‐
rity has traditionally
been the responsibil‐
ity of the utilities
and the energy in‐
dustry, and access to
information, even by
energy regulators
and emergency per‐
sonnel, is limited.
On the one hand,
individual compa‐
nies are perhaps in
the best position to assess their own facilities and
determine how best to protect their assets. On the
other hand, because individual companies may
understandably wish to keep their individual
plans and countermeasures confidential, there
may be only limited information available to
emergency response personnel.

Maine law provides that “[e]very public
utility shall furnish safe, reasonable and adequate
facilities and service” (35‐A MRSA §301(1).) The
PUC provides oversight and encouragement, but
security itself is primarily the responsibility of
the utilities, which are required by FERC to meet
certain security standards. Meanwhile, the secu‐
rity of electric genera‐
tion in Maine and
much of the regional
electric generation on
which Maine depends
are an industry respon‐
sibility pursuant to fed‐
eral standards and are
not regulated by State
government.
Security of inter‐
state facilities, such as
gas pipelines, is also an
industry responsibility,
with some federal over‐
sight. Security plans are
filed with the U.S. De‐
partment of Homeland
Security. State utility
regulators have an op‐
portunity to review
these plans when they
are prepared, but cop‐
ies of the plans are not
kept at the State level.
Security of other private‐sector facilities,
such as petroleum storage facilities, is generally
handled by individual companies, in some cases
working cooperatively with local officials. Access
to information by State officials is subject to in‐
dustry discretion.
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II: TASK FORCE MODEL
One might assume that an energy emergency
plan should be detailed and specific. The reality,
however, is that because each emergency re‐
sponse, like each emergency, is unique, an en‐
ergy emergency plan should set up processes for
determining an appropriate response; it cannot
realistically prescribe appropriate responses for

all potential situations. This plan is designed to
provide guidance on the energy aspects of short‐
term crises and emergencies that unfold due to
unfortunate sequences of events.

The Continuum of Responsibility During all phases of Energy Emergency Management
MEMA

OEIS
Mitigation

Pre‐Response

Response

Recovery

THE FOUR PHASES OF AN ENERGY EMERGENCY
The four phases of ‘an emergency’ for planning purposes typically include mitigation, preparedness
response and recovery.
1. Mitigation: Proactive mitigation programs lessen the risk of an energy emergency and may re‐
duce the need for preparedness activities, including ETF mobilization. Mitigation may include
policies, programs, and educational initiatives that encourage load reductions, energy efficiency,
energy resource diversity, fuel‐price risk management (e.g. through pre‐buy arrangements), and
protection of at‐risk populations. Mitigation activities are functions of the State’s energy pro‐
grams, and they take on added importance in the context of emergency planning.
2. Preparedness or “Pre‐Response”: . Also called pre‐response, preparedness activities may include
situation assessment, intergovernmental communication and coordination, and proactive provi‐
sion of public information. The ETF activates during this phase to inform the ERT, which is the
entity responsible for coordinating State response activities.
3. Response: Possible responses to an actual or perceived energy emergency can range from no ac‐
tion to, in extreme situations, fuel rationing and direct assistance. The ETF may continue to func‐
tion to support the ERT during the response phase to ensure effective intergovernmental com‐
munication and coordination and to provide guidance to the Governor and other response agen‐
cies.
4. Recovery: Most emergencies do not warrant recovery action from the State. The Federal Emer‐
gency Management Agency (FEMA) does, however, provide assistance for physical damage in‐
curred by certain utilities. This assistance would be pursued by the qualifying utilities them‐
selves, where appropriate; ETF activity during this phase is not anticipated.
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II: Task Force
Model
(Continued)

A Pre‐Emergency Energy
Task Force (PEETF) con‐
venes in anticipation of an
energy emergency. In the
event that the Governor formally declares an en‐
ergy emergency, the PEETF will then inform
MEMA’s response as it carries out its own man‐
agement plan, the State Emergency Operations
Plan (EOP). Specifically, the PEETF would have
pre‐identified fiscal, personnel and physical re‐
sources and provided for the development an
Emergency Task Force (ETF) to assist and inform
MEMA’s Emergency Response Team (ERT).

pecially in an acute emergency.
B. ENERGY TASK FORCE COMPOSITION
The ETF’s composition will be tailored to the
event. The ETF should include decision‐making
representatives from State agencies relevant to
the emergency, and it should be expanded as ap‐
propriate to include relevant industry, county
government, local government, and nonprofit
participants.

A list of potential State agency participants and
their respective authorities regarding energy
emergencies is provided in Table 1. More de‐
Because energy situations are dynamic, this plan tailed descriptions of energy programs and ex‐
addresses the need for timely information and
pertise across State agencies is contained in the
flexibility. In an acute emergency that does not
2003 Maine Energy Programs Resource Guide,
allow time to convene a PEETF or an ETF,
updated regularly and available at
MEMA will have to act without the assistance of www.maineenergyinfo.com/docs/Directory.pdf
a formal ETF.
In a sudden and severe energy emergency that
overwhelms the state’s ability to respond, the
Governor would immediately request federal
assistance and the ERT would then work with
federal agencies and the private sector through
the Energy Annex (Emergency Support Function
#12) of the National Response Framework.

A. ENERGY TASK FORCE MOBILIZATION
The Energy Task Force (ETF) can be mobilized
by the Governor, the Governor’s Office of En‐
ergy Independence and Security, or the Energy
Resources Council. The ETF serves in a situation‐
assessment and planning role. In a declared en‐
ergy emergency, the ETF provides technical sup‐
port to the Emergency Response Team (ERT),
which is managed by MEMA. Although the for‐
mation of a task force subset may help focus
ERC’s involvement, authority for planning and
response should clearly reside with MEMA, es‐

In many cases, industry can provide the best in‐
formation on what is driving a given supply or
price situation. Public‐private cooperation can
also be invaluable for getting information to the
public quickly and affordably. Potential industry
participants are utilities, generation plant own‐
ers, liquid fuels distributors and brokers, pipe‐
line representatives, and trade associations. Up‐
to‐date contacts for energy industry participants
are available from the PUC and OEIS.
Other potential task force participants include
county and municipal governments, the Ameri‐
can Red Cross, and other assistance agencies and
organizations. Participants may include mem‐
bers of MEMA’s ERT as well as members of
VOAD (Voluntary Organizations Active in Dis‐
aster); ERT and VOAD member lists are avail‐
able from MEMA.
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II: Task Force
Model
(Continued)

C. CONCEPT OF
OPERATIONS
ETF operations are based
on the following general

assumptions:
♦ The ETF will provide technical assistance,
advice, and support to the ERT and to the
Governor’s office. It will facilitate communi‐
cation and information sharing.

♦

Access to reliable information is crucial. All
agencies with relevant information will vol‐
untarily provide it. The information pro‐
vided in this report is for illustration only; it
is by no means adequate in itself as the basis
for emergency actions.
♦ All agencies identified as having a role in the
management of a potential energy emer‐
gency will voluntarily participate in the ETF
process.

Table 1. Maine State Agencies with Resources for Energy Emergency Preparedness
Agency
Maine Emergency
Management
Agency

Office of the Governor

Governor’s Office
of Energy Independence and Security

Public Utilities
Commission

Administrative &
Financial Services

Resources
Statutory authority to coordinate the activities of all organizations for emergency management within the State Assistance with public information in pre-event status of energy emergencies
• Coordination of energy emergency planning with county and local government and
volunteer agencies
• Authority to call in the National Guard for assistance Information and system vulnerabilities and security risks
• Run Simulated Table-top Energy Emergency exercise for the Energy Task Force
Executive authority to convene an ETF, as needed
• Authority to proclaim an energy emergency (37-B MRSA-742)
• In cases of emergency, certain powers to implement or waive certain programs,
standards, priorities and quotas
Authority to convene an ETF, as needed
• Fuel supply and price monitoring
• Advising the Governor and Legislature on energy emergencies related to heating
and transportation fuels and energy policy generally.
• Communication and coordination point of contact with petroleum terminal operators
during an energy emergency
• Receipt and management of fuel inventory data twice a month from terminal operators
Advising the Governor during energy emergencies re. electricity; also waiver authority
on its regulations during emergency situations
• Authority to require updates of utility restoration plans and infrastructure information to improve utility readiness
• Monitoring of utility activities, including facility/service outages
• GIS and other data on key facilities
• Interagency notification by email of energy emergency information
• Maintenance of an energy industry emergency contact list
• Member of the Emergency Response Team
Management of the State of Maine’s fuel inventory for State facilities
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Table 1. Maine State Agencies with Resources for Energy Emergency Preparedness (continued)
Administrative &
Financial Services

Management of the State of Maine’s fuel inventory for State facilities

Department of
Conservation
Environmental
Protection
Human Services
Department of
Transportation

Mobile generators and communications equipment for remote facilities that can be used
for emergency response
Authority to approve suspensions or waivers of certain requirements for limited periods
of time to relieve or avoid an energy shortage
Emergency and other assistance programs
Management of the State of Maine’s fuel inventory for transportation
Established protocols for reporting energy delivery issues at Port facilities and sharing
information
Administration of various transportation demand management programs
Administration of LIHEAP and weatherization programs
Energy Crisis Intervention Program (ECIP) which provides emergency fuel deliveries
and heating system repair
Authority to grant transportation waivers regarding border issues, weight limits, route
restrictions, etc.
Investigation of potential violations and enforcement of Monopolies and Profiteering
law.10 MRSA§§1101-1109 and the Unfair Trade Practices Act.5 MRSA§ 207 and market power monitoring under Petroleum Market Share Act. 10 MRSA §1671-1682.
In-house energy industry expertise and relationships with consumer groups

Maine Housing

Maine State Police
Attorney General

Public Advocate

♦

The ETF will be led by
the Director of the Gover‐
nor’s Office of Energy Inde‐
pendence and Security.
♦ The ETF will expand on
a situation‐specific basis to
include industry participants and local, re‐
gional, or federal government.
♦ Where the ETF is not expanded to county or
local officials, MEMA’s ERT will share ERT
contact information with the ETF, as appro‐
priate.

II: Task Force
Model
(Continued)

Some mitigation programs are also resources for
the ETF to call upon during preparedness or re‐
sponse activities:
♦ Existing fuel assistance programs to low‐
income households can provide a safety net
during winter price shocks, which can lessen
the effect of an energy crisis in the community
at large. Margin over rack program through

Maine Housing further assists people with
low incomes.
♦ Public education efforts such as Keep ME
Warm, Fuel‐Wise, 10% Challenge, and
www.maineenergyinfo.com offer energy effi‐
ciency information and educational materials.
Each participating department or organization
conducts those activities germane to its mission,
and all active departments and organizations
must be fully informed of actions taken. The ETF
is not intended to supersede the ERT, PUC, or
other departmental or organizational authorities.
The ETF would participate in response activities.
Response activities, where relevant, would in‐
volve implementation of the State Emergency
Operations Plan (EOP), which defines opera‐
tional procedures for all types of hazards and is
administered by the Maine Emergency Manage‐
ment Agency in emergency situations. The EOP
15

II: Task Force
Model
(Continued)

is organized by function,
identifying those steps nec‐
essary to carry out direction
and control, alerting and
warning, resource manage‐
ment, evacuation, mass care, emergency public
information, etc.

♦

ETF involvement in the recovery phase is not an‐
ticipated. (Recovery activities, if pursued, might
involve requests for federal disaster relief and
would be initiated by those entities that would
benefit, such as utilities.)
♦

D. COMMUNICATION
ETF operations would likely include vital com‐
munications:
♦ Gathering data.
♦ Assessing risks and impacts.
♦ Developing a situation‐specific action plan
before taking action.
♦ Updating, integrating, and reviewing data.
♦ Reassessing risks and impacts.
♦ Revising the situation‐specific action plan.

♦

In addition to any communication processes es‐
tablished by and for the specific ETF, the follow‐
ing communication routes are available:
♦
♦ Federal email notification system for major
energy disruptions. The USDOE Office of
Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability
(OE) maintains a restricted‐access communi‐
cations network for key State‐level personnel
to exchange information and coordinate with
each other and the Department of Energy
during energy emergencies. This system, En‐
ergy Emergency Assurance Coordinators
(EEAC), includes representatives from OEIS
and the PUC.
♦ Regional energy monitoring group. The New
England Governors’ Conference (NEGC) con‐
ducts weekly conference calls among energy

coordinators in each of the New England
states and New York, including appropriate
federal agency and energy industry represen‐
tatives, to share information on regional en‐
ergy supply, demand, and price issues.
Northeast Gas Association: The Northeast
Gas Association (NGA) has a task force that
assembles to review the operation and supply
situation of the gas network in New England.
NGA participates in the weekly NEGA con‐
ference calls and reports directly to state
agencies on the status of gas supply and secu‐
rity in the region on a bi‐weekly basis.
Ongoing communications on energy security.
The Energy Resource Council reserves time
on its monthly agenda to share information
on energy security. It is the responsibility of
Council members to make sure their staffs in‐
form them of emerging energy situations and
to share information with other council mem‐
bers and with MEMA, when appropriate.
Proactive information sharing for planning
purposes. Information on new studies of re‐
gional energy security or information about
potential energy hazards should, as a matter
of regular business, be shared with the PUC,
OEIS, and MEMA.
Media: In an emergency, it is important to
keep the media informed but calm about the
situation as it develops; in an emergency, par‐
tial information is almost always better than
an official information vacuum. Care should
be taken not to sensationalize events to the
press. Keeping the public calm will help pre‐
vent panic‐buying. To the extent possible,
members of the ETF should share timely in‐
formation on the scope, nature, severity, and
possible duration of the emergency and share
all information communicated with the media
with each other to encourage consistency and
clarity in communications.
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III: TRANSITION FROM PREPAREDNESS TO RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
When to shift from preparedness to response will necessarily be situation‐specific, and any transi‐
tion must dovetail with ISO New England’s Operating Procedures and federal agency procedures
through the National Response Framework. Detailed descriptions of the National Response Frame‐
work Emergency Support Function 12 Energy Annex and the relevant ISO‐NE Operating Proce‐
dures are in Appendix O and P respectively.
STATUS CALM: Routine supply and price moni‐
toring reveals no alarming trends.
♦ OEIS continues to monitor the supply and
price of energy resources.
♦ OEIS routinely disseminates information
to the public, the Governor, Legislature,
and members of the ETF, as appropriate.
♦ Administration of existing mitigation pro‐
grams (conservation, public education,
etc.) continues.
STATUS WATCHFUL: Monitoring indicates a trend
to high prices and/or shortages in Maine or short‐
ages in neighboring interrelated markets that
could affect Maine.
♦ The Energy Resources Council and/or
Governor’s Office calls for follow‐up meet‐
ings of the ETF. Assignments are given for
active information sharing, research, and
coordination activities.
♦ ETF designees assess availability of inter‐
agency resources, set priorities, and assess
the need for shifting personnel resources
among state agencies to perform event‐
specific duties.
♦ ETF designees step up public information
programs as appropriate to include spe‐
cialized press releases, public service an‐
nouncements, newspaper inserts, etc.
♦ ETF designees assess the need for volun‐
tary energy‐saving activities such as ex‐
panded ride‐sharing programs, voluntary
conservation, etc.
STATUS ALERT: An actual critical shortage is oc‐
curring, a sudden event makes a shortage immi‐

nent, or long‐term high prices have exhausted
financial resources.
Note: The alert level either (1) initiates the activities
listed below, or (2) describes, for organizational pur‐
poses, the state of affairs as symbolized by the activi‐
ties below.
Alert Level 1 – Local and state emergency re‐
sponse agencies respond to the emergency.
Alert Level 2 –
♦ The State EOC is activated with partial staff to
track and coordinate response activities.
♦ Members of the ETF act as technical advisors
to the EOC.
♦ The ETF considers steps the Governor can
take short of a declaration of emergency, such
as load reduction through conservation,
checking on neighbors, and, finally, evacua‐
tion or relocation of those most affected.
♦ The need for a Governor’s Declaration of En‐
ergy Emergency is assessed (see Appendix A).
♦ Consideration begins, if appropriate, of a re‐
quest for release from the Northeast Heating
Oil Reserve.
ALERT LEVEL 3 – Full activation. All activities and
communications should adhere to the protocols
of the National Incident Management system.
♦ All Alert Level 2 activities, plus activation of
the State’s full Emergency Response Team.
ALERT LEVEL 4 – Catastrophic event.
♦ All Level 3 activities, plus implementation of
the Federal Response Framework (NRF).
♦ The ERT works with the federal government
and the private sector through the Energy An‐
nex (Emergency Support Function #12) of the
National Response Framework.
17

IV. INTER‐JURISDICTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
Maine may coordinate its energy emergency activities with those of other Northeast states and east‐
ern Canadian provinces. The New England ISO, the New England Governors’ Conference, the Na‐
tional Association of State Energy Officials, the Conference of New England Governors and Eastern
Canadian Premiers, the Northeast International Committee on Energy, the New England Governor’s
Power Planning Committee, the Coalition of New England Governors, the New England Conference
of Public Utility Commissions, and the U.S. Department of Energy are a few of the organizations
available for inter‐jurisdictional coordination.

V. CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT
Any assignment of lines of succession, designation and protection of primary and alternate opera‐
tional sites, and preservation of records will be conducted in accordance with the State Emergency
Operations Plan and applicable county and local plans.
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VI. MAINE’S ENERGY RESOURCES AND FACTORS
CONTRIBUTING TO THEIR VULNERABILITY
Basic information on Maine’s energy resources
and Factors Contributing to their vulnerability is
provided below for illustrative purposes. Con‐
tinuously generated current information should
be assembled by ETF activities. Maine’s energy
resources depend on both in‐state and regional
infrastructure and regional energy markets.

panies, both domestic and foreign. Oil is an inter‐
national commodity and the U.S. imports well
over half the oil it consumes. Maine imports 100
percent of its oil and natural gas. The price and
supply of oil here are driven not only by the mar‐
ket forces of supply and demand that influence
other commodities, but also by U.S. domestic and
foreign policy decisions in combination with the
policies of oil‐producing nations. Other market
A. LIQUID FUELS
forces have a large impact on the petroleum in‐
Our nation, region, and state have become dan‐
gerously dependent on foreign fossil fuels. Crude dustry, including product seasonality, curtail‐
ments (such as re‐
oil prices have esca‐
finery outages), and
lated to nearly
Maine's Total Petroleum Consumption
acts of nature.
$120/barrel and
World oil and gas
natural gas prices
Jet Fuel
5%
markets are com‐
are constantly ris‐
ing. Meanwhile,
plex and so energy
LPG
Maine is nearly 100
emergencies that
6%
percent dependent
involve petroleum
Gasoline
on petroleum prod‐
products are com‐
46%
ucts to fuel our
plex, requiring
Distilate
cars, trucks, marine
states to work with
43%
craft, and planes;
multiple organiza‐
we are nearly 80
tions to develop ef‐
percent dependent
fective responses.
on petroleum prod‐
Figure 2. Total Petroleum Consumption (EIA)
ucts to heat our
At the refining
residences—the greatest per capita dependency level, the availability of petroleum products de‐
in the country. Diesel prices have caused major
pends on the maintenance of an aging system of
economic hardship for our trucking and forest
refineries. In spite of advances in refining chem‐
istry, technology, and safety, no new refineries
products industries. Liquefied petroleum gas
have been constructed in the U.S. in over 20
(LPG), kerosene, and propane used for space
years. When refineries suffer outages of any kind,
heating, drying, and cooking; natural gas; and
heavy fuel oil are rising in price. Fuel used in in‐ product supply is restricted and prices increase.
dustrial boilers and electric power generation is The U.S. petroleum distribution and delivery sys‐
tem, with its network of underground pipelines,
not only harmful to the environment, it is also
regional and local storage, and sophisticated
increasing in cost.
computer controls, offers some reliability. But lo‐
Maine participates in a global and unregulated
cally, transfers and re‐supply efforts can be dis‐
petroleum market that involves numerous com‐ rupted by severe weather and natural disasters. If
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I LIQUID FUELS
‐General
(continued)

problems occur in produc‐
tion, refining, or transport,
the result is often a spot
shortage with predictable
price impacts. In Maine, annual consumption of
#2 heating oil and kerosene is roughly 1,009 gal‐
lons per household and 427 million gallons state‐
wide.

set up by the National Response Framework
Energy Annex.

i. TRANSPORTATION FUELS
Maine transportation fuels arrive in Maine pri‐
marily by waterborne tanker or barge through
terminals in South Portland, Searsport, and Ban‐
gor. The fuels are distributed throughout the
state primarily by truck. Some portion is ex‐
Given the complexity of the international and na‐ ported by truck to neighboring states. There is
tional petroleum markets, there are steps a state also a pipeline for gasoline running from South
can take in response to a petroleum product
Portland to Bangor. The majority of transporta‐
shortage and/or dis‐
tion fuels come through
Distillate Fuel
ruption situation:
South Portland.
(636,108,000,000 Gallons)
♦ Issue public warn‐
ings and an‐
Factors Contributing to
Off-Highw ay
Other End
nouncements.
Maine’s Vulnerability:
1%
Farm (Mgal)
Users
1%
♦ Monitor condi‐
♦ Limited storage capac‐
2%
tions.
ity. Limited storage ca‐
On-Highw ay
Residential
28%
♦ Require county
pacity and the expense
49%
and municipal pe‐
and regulatory hurdles
Industrial
associated with increased
troleum product
2%
Commercial
storage capacity leave
emergency plans.
17%
♦ Issue public re‐
Maine with limited sup‐
quests for volun‐
plies in the event of dis‐
Figure
3.
Distillate
consumption
by
sector
(EIA)
ruptions. The amount of
tary demand re‐
2
ductions.
supply in storage varies by terminal and by
season. Two terminals in South Portland indi‐
♦ Enhance supply and re‐supply.
♦ Develop strong public/private relationships
cate they have nearly 30 days of gasoline sup‐
with all relevant international, national, re‐
ply reserves under normal demand circum‐
gional, state and local oil producers, refiners,
stances, though supplies may be lower during
3
retailers, and distributors.
the spring and fall, when the type of gasoline
♦ Grant waivers to delivery trucks to extend
used in Maine changes. During changeover,
4
hours of service.
there may be collectively only about a week’s
♦ Take investigative and enforcement measures.
worth of gasoline in storage.
♦ Impose purchase restrictions on liquid fuels
♦ Just in‐time inventory. Industry reliance on
and petroleum products, including minimum
just‐in‐time inventory depends on a flawless
purchase requirements, odd/even license
delivery system.
♦ Heavy reliance on one port. The vast majority
plate purchase authorizations, or staggered
of transportation fuel volume comes through
days of operation.
Portland Harbor.
♦ Request federal assistance using the protocols
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I LIQUID FUELS
‐Transportation
(continued)
‐#2 Heating Oil

♦

Price variations. Gasoline
prices are affected by
changes in crude oil prices
and changes in the supply/
demand balance. Typically, gasoline demand
is significantly higher at its seasonal summer
peak than at its low point (typically mid‐
January).
♦ Commercial reliance. Diesel fuel is used for
trucking, in the construction industries for
mobile equipment, and for backup electric
generation.

ii. #2 FUEL OIL/HEATING OIL
Maine residences are overwhelmingly dependent
on #2 heating oil to heat 80% their homes.5 While
the saturation of the market place allows the
prices in Maine to be slightly below the nation
average, the monolithic dependence leaves
Maine vulnerable to shortages and price spikes.

INFRASTRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION
The Northeast gets almost half its fuel oil supply
as a refined product from the Gulf Coast via the
Colonial pipeline to Linden, New Jersey. Refiner‐
ies in Philadelphia and New Jersey send oil to
Note: A number of factors contribute to Maine’s Boston and New York harbors. From there, wa‐
gasoline security:
terborne deliveries are made to Maine harbors
♦ Performance‐based environmental regulation. via coastal terminals in Portland, South Portland,
Maine’s gasoline formulation standards are
Searsport, Bucksport, Wiscasset, Yarmouth, and
performance‐based. Generally speaking,
Bangor. (Deliveries to Wiscasset and Yarmouth
much of the State uses conventional gasoline, are heavy #6 oils for electric generation). Maine
but the regulations are flexible enough to al‐ terminals also receive roughly 50 percent of its
low reformulated gasoline (RFG) to substitute products by truck and marine transportation
as necessary. Southern Maine relies on mid‐
from an Irving refinery in St. John, New Bruns‐
Atlantic regular grade fuel for summertime
wick. Maine has pipeline capacity that carries
crude oil to refineries and bulk terminals near
use but RFG blends used in southern New
England also meet Maine’s fuel specifications. Montreal, Quebec.
This is important for energy security because
when supply is limited or demand is high, the Maine’s fuel oil distribution system has three
market can pull in a variety of qualifying fu‐ components: primary terminal facilities, which
els to meet Maine demand. Being part of a lar‐ receive bulk loads of products; secondary, or
ger market also reduces risk of price fluctua‐ bulk, storage facilities; and tertiary distribution
tions and supply disruptions.
facilities with local tank storage. Maine’s oil dis‐
♦ Regional fuel specifications. As a matter of
tribution system and the state of local inventories
policy, Maine is pursuing a regional fuel
depend on the petroleum industry’s ability to re‐
specification to further improve energy secu‐ supply the Northeast.
rity. Regional fuel specifications are important
because Maine’s transportation fuel market is FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MAINE’S
relatively small. If Maine had a boutique fuel, VULNERABILITY
it might only be supplied by a single refinery, ♦ Limited local storage. Maine has very little
increasing Maine’s vulnerability to supply
storage capacity, no pipelines for local distri‐
disruptions.
bution, and little tankage. At any given time,
Maine has the capability to hold and distrib‐
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I LIQUID FUELS
‐#2 Heating Oil
(continued)

ute about four to five days’
worth of heating oil.
♦ Distance to refineries.
There are no refineries in
New England, although the one in St. John,
New Brunswick, is an active source for re‐
gional supplies.
♦ Just‐in‐time inventory management. Over the
years, the petroleum product distribution sys‐
tem has changed from storage to just‐in‐time
inventories, or fresh supply operations. This
eliminates large storage tanks for environ‐
mental and economic reasons. Industry reli‐
ance on just‐in‐time inventories is risky, as it
demands a flawless delivery system, espe‐
cially given limited in‐system storage. When
inventories are low, relatively small changes
in demand can result in significant price
changes.

♦

Location at end of the supply line. Maine is at
the end of a long supply line and is heavily
dependent on ship or barge delivery of petro‐
leum products. This dependence on marine
transportation leaves Maine vulnerable to a
variety of economic and weather conditions.
♦ Use of fuel oil in most Maine homes. Either #2
fuel oil or #6 fuel oil/kerosene is used by more
than 80 percent of Maine households for
space and water heating (EIA 2001), making
the state highly dependent on fuel oil supply
reliability.
♦ Weather dependencies. Marine transportation
facilities can be iced in during severe weather,
and Coast Guard ice cutters increasingly have
other demands on them. Truck transport can
be constrained by ice and snow.
♦ Dual‐fuel power plants. Gas‐fired power
plants in the region and some industrial facili‐
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I LIQUID FUELS
‐#2 Heating Oil
(continued)
‐Propane

♦

♦

♦

♦

ties in Maine use #2 oil as a
backup fuel. Thus the #2 fuel
oil market can be signifi‐
cantly affected by supply
disruptions or price shocks in natural gas
markets.
Pipeline vulnerability. Portland Pipeline dam‐
age, constraint, or curtailment could pose in‐
ternational vulnerabilities.
Infrastructure limitations elsewhere in the re‐
gion. The Chelsea Street Bridge Terminal in
Everett, Massachusetts, has a very narrow ac‐
cess point that can accommodate only single‐
hulled tankers, which are few in number; and
even single‐hulled tankers pass with only
inches to spare. According to the Massachu‐
setts Office of Energy Resources, an accident
at this terminal would put 16 percent of New
England’s oil supply in jeopardy.
Regional reserve limitations. The regional
heating oil reserve can, under certain condi‐
tions, be used to relieve regional demand. But
because the reserve is small (about 2 million
barrels) and is stored in New Jersey, Con‐
necticut, and Rhode Island, the oil is unlikely
to be physically delivered to Maine under
emergency conditions. (See Appendix G for a
description of federal and regional petroleum
reserves.) In addition, prompt movement of
product from the regional heating oil reserve
to retail dealers may be difficult due to prior
commitments of available trucks and barges.
At best, releases from the reserve might affect
supply and price elsewhere in the region,
with indirect supply and price benefits for
Maine.
Ten days for foreign deliveries. It takes about
ten days for ships to bring heating oil from
the Gulf of Mexico into New York Harbor and
from suppliers in Venezuela to New England.

iii. PROPANE
Roughly 26,245 Maine households (5.5 percent of
the population) use propane as a primary source
of heat.6 Businesses including restaurants, big‐
box retail stores, light manufacturing enterprises,
greenhouses, chicken and tomato farms, nursing
homes, and hospitals also use propane. During
the last decade, Maine’s propane consumption
has increased, with February 2006 usage at
337,000 gallons per day. Estimates of Maine’s
current propane consumption data indicate that
450,000 gallons per day is typical in the winter. In
Maine, annual consumption of propane for home
heating is roughly 1,990 gallons per household
and 58 million gallons statewide. The annual cost
per household to heat with this fuel is roughly
$2,772.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION
New England receives propane by rail, sea, and
pipeline. Algerian and Middle Eastern propane
comes via terminals in Providence, Rhode Island,
and Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The Texas
Eastern Products Pipeline Company (TEPPCO)
pipeline from Texas to Albany, New York, pro‐
vides more supply, and outsourced Canadian
propane arrives in Maine primarily by rail. Sev‐
enty percent of Maine’s propane arrives by rail to
a depot in Auburn. Most of this product is deliv‐
ered by Canadian National, CSX, and Maine
Montreal and Atlantic (MMA) railroads. Product
comes from refineries in Canada and is provided
by an affiliate of Duke Energy named NGL Ser‐
vices, which acquired former Gas Supply Re‐
sources in May 2001. The Denver‐based company
is also a general partner of the TEPPCO pipeline.
GSR’s integrated propane terminal operation had
an import terminal facility in Providence, Rhode
Island, and bulk supply depots in Duke Energy’s
Northeast network in the following locations:
Montpelier, Vermont; Albany, New York; West‐
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field, Massachusetts; York,
Pennsylvania; and Auburn
and Bangor, Maine. The Au‐
burn facility has an on‐site
storage capacity of 120,000 gallons, and Duke op‐
erates a joint venture with R.H. Foster in Bangor
with a storage capacity of 60,000 gallons. Addi‐
tional supplies arrive by truck (SPO 2002).

iv. KEROSENE
There are two grades of kerosene: K‐1 and K‐2.
K‐2 is the most common and is used for space
heating, domestic hot water, and wick‐fed lamps.
K‐1 is a very low sulfur grade that is typically
used in unvented heaters (unvented space heat‐
ers can be moved from room to room). Kerosene
is often the fuel of choice for mobile homes be‐
cause kerosene, unlike heating oil, does not con‐
geal when stored outdoors at temperatures be‐
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MAINE’S
low freezing. In the commercial sector, kerosene
VULNERABILITY
♦ Limited number of suppliers. Any disruption is added to diesel fuel to keep it flowing at winter
to a single supply source could have signifi‐
temperatures.
cant impact.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION
♦ Heavy reliance on single delivery point. The
majority of product arrives at a single facility Kerosene is trucked from terminals that are sup‐
by rail.
plied by barge or tanker. Three terminals cur‐
♦ Petroleum market fluctuations. Propane
rently supply kerosene in Maine, though the mix
prices generally correspond with crude oil
of products stored at particular terminals can
and natural gas prices because it is made from change substantially and more (or fewer) termi‐
nals may handle kerosene at different times.
crude oil and natural gas.
Kerosene supplies are variable and fluctuate
♦ Just‐in‐time delivery. Like other petroleum
products, propane is subject to the risks asso‐ from month to month.
ciated with just‐in‐time delivery.
♦ Commercial and industrial use. About 2.4
Factors Contributing to Maine’s
percent of Maine’s commercial energy use
Vulnerability
and about 0.6 percent of industrial energy use ♦ Market fluctuations and infrastructure limita‐
tions. As a petroleum‐based product, kero‐
relies on propane (EIA 2005).
sene is subject to many of the same supply,
♦ Weather‐related vulnerabilities. Regional de‐
price, and distribution vulnerabilities as fuel
livery capability may be impaired if storms
oil and propane (see above).
close roads or ice blocks terminal access.
♦ Dependence on Canadian railroad deliveries. ♦ Percent of households served. About 39,600
♦ No legal or statutory mechanism for collect‐
Maine households. or about 5 percent of the
ing data on propane deliveries.
population, heats with kerosene.
♦ No communication protocol with Maine and
♦ Domestic dependency. Homes heated with
regional propane terminals and dealers.
kerosene often have no alternative heating
♦ Lack of information about increased demand
source.
for propane in the local business sector.
♦ Low‐income households. Many kerosene us‐
♦ Lack of real‐time information to monitor
ers are lower‐income households with less
freight movements in New England, Maine,
capacity to withstand price shocks.
and Canada.
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II NATURAL GAS

In Maine, natural gas annual
consumption for home heat‐
ing is roughly 69,400 cubic
feet per household and 1.46
billion cubic feet statewide. Four percent of the
Maine population heats primarily with natural
gas.

an LDC has a more limited range of options in
reacting to a natural gas emergency than a verti‐
cally integrated utility does. But LDCs are re‐
quired by law to have emergency plans to cope
with gas infrastructure disruptions, and federal
pipeline safety rules apply to both LDCs and in‐
terstate pipelines.

Maine and the rest of New England have become Emergency steps that gas companies take during
increasingly dependent on natural gas to gener‐ a shortage include:
ate electricity (approximately 60 percent of
♦ Purchasing and transporting additional gas.
Maine’s and 40 percent of the region’s generating ♦ Rerouting gas deliveries.
♦ Increasing withdraw‐
capacity) and conse‐
Natural
Gas
Consum
ption
by
Sector
als from storage.
quently increased
49,604.88 MMCF
♦ Increasing withdraw‐
pressure has been put
als from other operating
on natural gas sup‐
plies. Decreasing Ca‐
system sources.
Residential
♦ Increasing pipeline
nadian supplies have
2%
Commercial
driven many compa‐
pressure.
10%
nies to propose con‐
♦ Issuing public warn‐
Industrial
6%
struction of liquefied
ings and announce‐
natural gas (LNG) fa‐
ments.
♦ Requesting that cus‐
cilities in Maine, New
England, and Canada
tomers voluntarily re‐
Electric
Pow er
to meet the region’s
duce gas demand.
82%
♦ Arranging for import
growing demand for
of compressed natural
natural gas. An LNG
gas or liquefied petro‐
terminal has been per‐ Figure 5. Natural gas use by sector (EIA)
leum gas.
mitted and is under construction in St. John, New
♦ Interrupting selected customers.7
Brunswick. Furthermore, because of the electric
grid’s dependence on this fuel, natural gas short‐ ♦ Developing strong public/private relation‐
ships with the leaders in the natural gas pro‐
ages take on added importance.
duction, transmission, and distribution indus‐
tries;
The natural gas business structure is very com‐
plex. Gas production resources, transmission sys‐ ♦ Implementing gas cutoffs.8
tems, and local distribution systems are usually
♦ Taking investigative and/or enforcement
measures.
owned by different companies. The “gas utility”
from which most customers buy product is often The manner in which a state agency works with a
an LDC that may not have a contract that assures gas company depends upon the legal authorities
delivery of out‐of‐state gas supplies through in‐ in place. A state may:
terstate transmission pipelines. For this reason,
♦ Review gas company emergency plans
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♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

♦

Review county and mu‐
nicipal natural gas emer‐
gency plans
♦ Make public warnings
and announcements
Assist in the arrangement of special gas pur‐
chase contracts
Issue requests for a reduction in gas use
Implement gas demand reduction measures
at State facilities
Declare a state of emergency
Implement measures similar to those for pe‐
troleum emergencies
Establish notification protocols
Request federal assistance
Take investigative and/or enforcement meas‐
ures.

The curtailment plans in Maine are part of the
LDC’s tariff filing. Curtailment priorities are
placed on protecting human health and safety
and are implemented to ensure continued service
to residential customers and other critical loads.
With respect to natural gas for electricity genera‐
tion, electric generators without contracts for
firm gas supply will not have access to gas sup‐
ply during shortage events, such as occurred in
December of 2007.

then manually re‐light all of the customers that
have been shut off. A loss of gas in the winter can
have immediate serious health impacts.
Most of the natural gas supplies used in the U.S.
originate in the southern states of Texas, Louisi‐
ana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Wyoming, and in
the Gulf of Mexico as well as in Alaska and Can‐
ada. Most of the gas consumed in Maine origi‐
nates from either western Canada or Sable Island.
Gas is imported through high‐capacity, high‐
pressure pipelines owned by interstate gas trans‐
mission companies. Within a state, gas is pro‐
vided by a local distribution company (LDC) that
operates intrastate and local service lines. An
LDC may also rent or own gas storage facilities
that are a crucial component of the gas supply
system.
Two interstate natural gas pipelines cross the
state of Maine:

1. The Maritimes & Northeast Pipeline (M&NE)
runs through eastern, central, and southern
Maine from Calais to Berwick. This regional in‐
ternational pipeline transports eastern Canadian
gas from Sable Island, through Maine, and on to
southern New England. Gas from this pipeline is
accessed in Maine at two locations—one in the
greater Bangor area and the other in Westbrook.
INFRASTRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION
Because of system design, disruptions in delivery This line is currently being upgraded to double
of natural gas for heating are less frequent than
its throughput capacity to carry anticipated liq‐
disruptions in electricity. Most local natural gas
uefied natural gas (LNG) volumes from the Can‐
systems have multiple interconnection or rerout‐ aport LNG import facility in New Brunswick to
ing capabilities buried underground. But when
U.S. markets to our south.
disruptions do occur, substantial risk to health
and safety is possible. A break in a natural gas
2. The Portland Natural Gas Transmission Sys‐
tem (PNGTS) Pipeline runs through western
pipeline can cause an explosion or fire. A total
loss of gas supply in a region can take weeks or
Maine, transporting western Canadian gas from
months to repair and restore as crews must purge an interconnection with the Trans Canada pipe‐
air from the entire system, re‐pressurize it, and
line in Quebec to the New England market. A
27

28

II NATURAL GAS
(CONTINUED)

smaller lateral line provides
gas service to Maine power
plants located in Rumford
and Jay. This line joins the
M&NE line in Westbrook.
A third interstate pipeline, Granite State Gas
Transmission Company (GSGT) connects North‐
ern Utilities Inc. to the national gas grid to our
south, affording Northern an alternate supply
route. Northern can receive gas from M&NE
from a connection in Lewiston and receives much
of its supply from PNGTS through a gate station
in Westbrook.
The regional supply of gas is augmented by the
infusion of LNG delivered by ship to a Boston‐
area terminal where a portion is transported into
Maine by truck to be introduced into the pipeline
system. According to the Northeast Gas Associa‐
tion, LNG provides as much as 25 percent of the
daily peak supply in winter and about 15 percent
of New England’s total gas supply in 2000.
Three local distribution companies provide gas
supply to central and southern portions of the
state using natural gas delivered via one of the
transmission pipelines.
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MAINE’S
VULNERABILITY
Local distribution companies (LDCs) are regu‐
lated by the PUC, while the interstate pipelines
are subject to federal regulation. Security is pri‐
marily a private‐sector responsibility, with some
input, oversight, and encouragement by regula‐
tors. LDC emergency plans are on file with the
PUC. Interstate pipeline security plans are on file
with the U.S. Department of Homeland Secu‐
rity’s Transportation Security Administration
(TSA).

Some other considerations:
♦ Infrastructure visibility. Gas infrastructure is
usually highly visible and thus not a hidden
target.
♦ Internet insecurity. Gas utilities increasingly
use modern technology, including the inter‐
net, to monitor and control their facilities; the
internet is far from secure and accessible glob‐
ally.
♦ Limited access to pipeline security informa‐
tion. There is limited State access to (and
knowledge of) interstate pipeline vulnerabili‐
ties and security plans.
♦ Limited access to federal information. To
minimize inadvertent or unnecessary release
of sensitive information about critical infra‐
structure, federal agencies and some utilities
restrict information flow to States, complicat‐
ing the State and local responsibility to pro‐
vide initial response to emergencies.
♦ Insufficient deliverability on peak winter
days. Currently, at the regional level, there is
insufficient gas deliverability available on a
peak winter day for non‐firm contracts.
♦ Reliance on LNG during peak times. LDCs
are heavily dependent on LNG during times
of peak demand for natural gas. Demand for
LNG continues to increase, deliverability is
limited, and any disruption in deliveries
could have significant price impacts.
♦ Electric generation dependence on natural
gas. Electric generation plants generally have
non‐firm contracts, making them particularly
vulnerable to price spikes and supply short‐
ages.
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III. Electricity

or regional transmission organization (RTO)
structures operate regional electricity grids.
carries numerous technical
Many of the rules are administered by the Fed‐
constraints that limit what
eral Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).
can be done to prevent
power outages. “The system also contains many RTO/ISOs also operate market systems that so‐
licit and price transactions for various services.
automatic control devices that respond almost
As RTOs, they have real‐time knowledge of the
instantaneously to perturbations in supply, de‐
mand and other system conditions. Hence, some status of the electric system within their own and
adjacent operating areas, including fuel type and
measures taken to prevent outages can actually
increase risk and, in some cases, create cascading supplies, power plant operational status, and
predictive models that describe the reliability of
effects that can
forecasted
collapse the en‐
Maine Electric Power Sector Consumption
and current
tire system in a
Estimates, 2005
operations.
matter of min‐
They also
utes. There
have estab‐
have been
Distillate Fuel
Coal
lished emer‐
0%
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enough epi‐
7%
gency plans
sodes of this
for dealing
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Natural Gas
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with condi‐
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tions when
spread, system
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system is
rant care in the
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exercise of

The electric power system

measures un‐
der emergency
conditions.”9

RTO/ISOs
function as
Biomass
independent
32%
electric trans‐
Electricity re‐
mission op‐
Figure 6. Electric Power Consumption by Sector (EIA)
structuring in
erators, bal‐
Maine and in other regions of the U.S. has
changed the way electricity is produced and sold. ancing authorities and reliability coordinators for
a single state or multi‐state region. In the North‐
In many states, including Maine, utility‐owned
generating and transmission assets have been un‐ east there are two RTOs: the New England ISO
bundled, creating separate generating and trans‐ and the New York ISO. Both continually monitor
mission/distribution entities. Generation is now our regional system needs and resources. In the
owned by private entities and operates in a com‐ event of an identified situation that prevents the
petitive market. Regulated transmission and dis‐ system from operating reliably, it will declare a
system emergency. When time permits, an‐
tribution (T&D) utilities and State regulators
nouncement of a system emergency is typically
have less impact on the electric utility since re‐
structuring. Independent system operators (ISO) preceded by a system alert and a system warn‐
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representatives exchange and maintain current
ing. The following are ge‐
neric response measures that and 24‐hour contact names, data, and essential
communications devices.
may be taken by the RTO/
ISOs in the event of an elec‐
The relevant ISO‐NE operating procedures are
tricity emergency:
♦ Curtailing outside sales of power or increas‐
attached as an appendix to this report. In the
event of an electricity emergency, ISO‐NE in‐
ing power imports
♦ Modifying the operation of generating units
forms the appropriate state agencies and refers to
for emergency relief
these response procedures:
♦ Asking selected customers to reduce their
♦ Monitor Conditions
load, either voluntarily or with controlled ac‐ ♦ Issue public warnings and announcements
♦ Assist in the Arrangement of special electric‐
tive load management
♦ Asking all customers to voluntarily imple‐
ity purchase contracts
ment active load reductions
♦ Issue public request for load reduction
♦ Reducing voltage
♦ Implement load reduction measures at State
facilities
♦ Implementing controlled rotating interrup‐
tions
♦ Governor declares a state of emergency
III. Electricity
(CONTINUED)

The manner in which a state agency works with
an RTO/ISO in the implementation of some or all
of these measures depends on the legal authori‐
ties in place. In most instances, a cooperative
working relationship exists, as no state has legal
authority over an RTO/ISO. The usual arrange‐
ment is for the RTO/ISO to develop collaborative
working protocols that keep states informed un‐
der any system‐wide emergency condition iden‐
tified by the regional power entity. ISO New
England, the RTO for Maine, has a detailed set of
operating procedures that it follows in the event
of a short‐term capacity deficiency (OP‐4), a long‐
term energy emergency (OP‐21), or acute emer‐
gency (OP‐7). Communication with state agen‐
cies, including the PUC, OEIS, MEMA, and Gov‐
ernor’s Office, is an essential component of ISO
New England’s procedures. ISO New England’s
OP‐10 establishes communications protocols
within the context of emergency incidents and
disturbances. In addition, all relevant state agen‐
cies keep copies of all of the RTO/ISO website ad‐
dresses and ensure that the RTO/ISO state agency

The Governor’s Energy Emergency Powers in‐
clude the authority to act according to 37‐B
MRSA §742. See Section III, below:
♦ Issue public warnings and announcements
♦ Impose restrictions on the hours during
which commercial, industrial, public, and
school buildings may be open
♦ Impose restrictions on lighting levels in com‐
mercial, industrial, public, and school build‐
ings
♦ Impose restrictions on interior temperature in
commercial, industrial, public, and school
buildings
♦ Impose restrictions on the use of display and
decorative lighting
♦ Require mandatory interruption of selected
customers
♦ Grant waivers to utilities that have generators
operating at less than their technical limits
due to environmental or other restrictions
♦ Start up state‐owned backup generators to
provide additional capacity
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♦

ent System Operator for NEPOOL (ISO New
England) is responsible for regional system reli‐
ability and has an established procedure for
when the regional system is faced with energy
system permits
shortages. One of the first steps of the procedure,
♦ Request federal assistance when State re‐
known as OP4 (Operating Procedure 4) includes
sources are overwhelmed
voluntary conservation measures and emergency
♦ Take appropriate investigative and enforce‐
power purchases. The next actions involve re‐
ment measures
duced operating reserves and voltage reductions.
The final actions are radio and TV appeals for
conservation (power warnings), and in extreme
INFRASTRUCTURE AND DISTRIBUTION
Electric power in Maine is sold by largely de‐
circumstances ISO‐NE may request that the mes‐
regulated power providers in competition with
sage be personally reinforced by state governors.
one another. The delivery of power over trans‐
ISO New England also has a confidential system
mission and distribution lines is a monopoly ser‐ in place to communicate high‐security messages
vice provided by distribution companies and
to all power plants, many participants, and
regulated by the PUC. Maine distribution compa‐ neighboring control centers.
nies include three investor‐owned utilities and
ten consumer‐owned utilities. Significant
Maine T&D utility systems in northeastern Maine
amounts of electricity are imported over interna‐ are not directly connected to NEPOOL, but oper‐
tional federally regulated international transmis‐ ate as part of the Maritimes Control Area and
sion lines from New Brunswick and exported to both generates power locally and receives power
the rest of New England over federally regulated through transmission facilities owned by New
interstate transmission lines into New Hamp‐
Brunswick Power Company. As a result, market
shire.
conditions in Northern Maine can vary substan‐
tially from market conditions elsewhere in New
Maine’s Transmission and Distribution (T&D)
England.
utilities are required by law to provide safe, rea‐
sonable, and adequate facilities and service. As a FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO MAINE’S
result, they are responsible for system security
VULNERABILITY
♦ Vital services’ dependence on electricity. Elec‐
and for system restoration during emergency
tricity is used throughout the state for resi‐
events. The PUC provides support and collabo‐
dential, commercial, and industrial purposes.
rates with utilities, industry organizations, and
Electric power keeps security and communi‐
others on security issues. T&D system emergency
cation systems, life‐support systems, and
plans are on file with the PUC. Access to genera‐
computers operating. Any interruption in
tion facility security plans is at the discretion of
electricity can have immediate impact on vital
the generation company.
services.
♦ Infrastructure visibility. Electricity infrastruc‐
Except in the northeastern part of the state,
ture is usually highly visible and thus not a
Maine T&D utility systems are part of the New
hidden target.
England Power Pool (NEPOOL). The Independ‐
Direct utilities to use pre‐
determined customer resto‐
ration priority lists to the de‐
gree the physical distribution
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♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

Internet insecurity. Utili‐
ties increasingly use the
internet to monitor and con‐
trol their facilities, and the
internet is accessible globally and far from se‐
cure.
Reliance on competitive markets. Since imple‐
mentation of electric industry restructuring in
March 2000, prices for electric generation
have been determined through competitive
markets.
The regional supply’s dependence on natural
gas. Regional electric generating capacity is
increasingly dependent on the availability
and deliverability of natural gas. Most new
generating plants are gas‐fired. While some of
these plants are dual‐fuel design, in practice
they do not have the capability on site to use a
second fuel (e.g. no on‐site storage tanks for
fuel oil). In the event of a major natural gas
supply disruption, there would likely be a
significant cascading effect on the price and
availability of electricity.
Northern Maine’s dependence on New Bruns‐
wick. Northern Maine’s electricity supply
(and associated price) depends in large part
on New Brunswick Power’s policies and sup‐
ply situation.
The effect of fossil fuel prices. Oil and natural
gas are used to generate the majority of elec‐
tricity in the region, and they set the market
clearing price about two‐thirds of the hours.
As prices for these and other petroleum prod‐
ucts increase, electricity prices increase.
Limited access to information on critical infra‐
structure. To minimize inadvertent or unnec‐
essary release of sensitive information about
critical infrastructure, federal agencies and
some utilities restrict information flow to
states, complicating State and local responsi‐

III. Electricity
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bility to provide initial response to an incident
that challenges local infrastructure.
♦ Limited access to generation security informa‐
tion. Security plans for electric generation
plants are a private‐sector responsibility and
are generally proprietary and confidential.
They are generally not made available to
emergency managers.
Note: A number of factors contribute to Maine’s
electrical security:
♦ In Maine, local supply exceeds demand.
Maine has an electric generating capacity that
is nearly twice its peak demand. While much
of Maine’s generating capacity serves out‐of‐
state demand, the physical proximity of
Maine consumers to excess supply increases
local system reliability.
♦ Utility system security is a private sector re‐
sponsibility pursuant to federally mandated
national standards, with limited input from
the PUC. Utility plans are filed with, ISO‐NE,
NERC, FERC, NPCC, and Homeland Security
but are not regulated per se.
♦ Mutual aid. Electric utilities have responsive
mutual aid systems. When a geographic area
suffers extensive damage, electric utilities in
adjacent areas with available repair crews will
send those crews to assist with service resto‐
ration. The Governor could facilitate the de‐
livery of mutual aid by declaring an emer‐
gency and waiving hours of service require‐
ments.
♦ To a significant degree, electricity emergen‐
cies can be averted through sustained public
education and energy conservation measures
(mitigation) as witnessed in winter 2003‐04
when rolling blackouts were predicted by the
ISO but never occurred. Informed behavior
can result in positive effects and the adage ap‐
plies that “the easiest megawatt to generate is
the one that isn’t used.”
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VII. REFERENCES FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
♦

A list of basic references for energy resource in‐
formation is provided in Appendix C. It is as‐
sumed, however, that the Governor’s Office of
Energy Independence and Security will be the
best current information resource, especially for
contacts appropriate to a particular situation. Be‐
cause contact information can change quickly, it
is not provided as part of this plan.
The OEIS, PUC, MEMA, the members of the ERC
and the U.S. Department of Energy’s Energy In‐
formation Administration are important sources
of more detailed information on Maine’s energy
resources:
♦ Energy Resources Council energy information
website. Links to State, federal and industry
websites with energy information relevant to
Maine will be provided from the Energy Re‐
sources Council website:
www.maineenergyinfo.com/
resourcescouncil.html
♦ Information on energy resources critical to
Maine’s energy security is maintained at the
Governor’s Office of Energy Independence
and Security, MEMA and the PUC. An inven‐
tory of the state’s major energy facilities as
well as site‐specific security issues and plans
is available on a need‐to‐know basis from the
OEIS, MEMA and the PUC. GIS data on pri‐
mary energy infrastructure is being devel‐
oped by the OEIS in conjunction with Maine
Oil Dealers, MEMA, and the Northeast Gas
Association. The PUC maintains current, de‐
tailed GIS data on Maine electric and natural
gas transmission and distribution systems,
available for reference in the State Emergency
Operations Center, and the PUC maintains an
emergency contact list for Maine utilities and
some other key energy facilities.

♦

♦

♦
♦

Current information on winter heating fuels
inventories and prices is available seasonally
from OEIS. OEIS monitors terminal invento‐
ries, reporting to the legislature periodically
as requested. Heating fuel prices are surveyed
during October through March, calculated
and published on a weekly basis during the
heating season. These reports and annual sea‐
son summary reports to the DOE/EIA are
available at www.maineenergyinfo.com or by
request through the OEIS.
Information on Maine’s primary energy use
by fuel type is available from the U.S. Depart‐
ment of Energy’s Energy Information Ad‐
ministration. The most recent update of the
“State Energy Data Report” published bian‐
nually by Energy Information Administration
can be found at www.eia.doe.gov/pub/
state.data/pdf/me.pdf. [http://
tonto.eia.doe.gov/state/
state_energy_profiles.cfm?sid=ME contains
more recent data]
Information on petroleum industry security is
available from the American Petroleum Insti‐
tute (API). API has a lead role in interfacing
with key government agencies and dissemi‐
nating government intelligence concerning
potential acts of terrorism to the industry. API
will provide this role until a newly formed
Energy Information Sharing and Analysis
Center (ISAC) can take over this function. In
addition, API’s confidential March 2002 pub‐
lication “Security Guidance for the Petroleum
Industry, which provides information on se‐
curity procedures at petroleum facilities, is
available at MEMA on a need‐to‐know basis.
API’s website is www.api.org.
Maine Home Heating Report 2007
Year‐round heating oil and gasoline prices are
available through Chris Brown at
www.maineoil.com.
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♦

Various regional energy
security efforts and associ‐
ated information sources
may be relevant for Maine’s
energy emergency preparedness. Examples
are provided below, though these are for il‐
lustrative purposes only. The list will change
over time.
♦
The National Association of State Energy
Officials has proposed to develop a
“Northeastern States Coordinated Energy
Emergency Preparedness Plan.” This plan
would identify the various regional import
portals and their relative vulnerability as
well as the interstate movement of resources
and the impacts of various emergency meas‐
ures taken by individual states.
♦ The National Association of State Energy Offi‐
cials and the National Association of Regula‐
tory Utility Commissioners developed “State
Energy Assurance Guidelines,” updated in
November 2005, to serve as a template to fa‐
cilitate state energy emergency planning.
♦ The Independent System Operator for New
England (ISO New England) identifies electric
system vulnerabilities on an ongoing basis,
including vulnerabilities in the gas system on
which the electric system depends. A study
released in early 2002 addressed system vul‐

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

♦

nerabilities and system restoration priorities
and protocols.
Another ISO study released in August 2005
entitled, “Power Generation and Fuel Diver‐
sity in New England,” concluded that it is
crucial for stakeholders in New England and
wholesale electric and gas markets to identify
resource needs and chart a course to ensure
reliability of these interdependent systems
and to secure the region’s energy future.
The ISO New England State of the Market Re‐
port, 2004 concluded that the January 2004
cold snap experience led to important market
improvements in communication and that ad‐
ditional demand response is needed.
Dark Storm Northeast‐Mid‐Atlantic States En‐
ergy Assurance Exercise‐ June 19‐20th 2007
websites‐www.NEAssurance.govtools.us
Other New England States have energy emer‐
gency plans and protocols in place, some of
which are on file at MEMA.
Terrorist Incident Appendix to the State of
Maine Emergency Operations Plan, MEMA,
March 2002.
Security Guidance for the Petroleum Indus‐
try, API, April 2002

Copies of particular studies of importance to
Maine are available from the PUC.
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VIII. PLAN ADEQUACY AND MAINTENANCE
This plan defines a process for facilitating infor‐
mation and coordination during the period lead‐
ing up to a potential energy emergency. It pro‐
vides basic information on Maine’s energy re‐
sources and examples of their vulnerabilities. Be‐
cause potential energy emergency situations are
varied and dynamic, no one plan could anticipate
the universe of possible scenarios and appropri‐
ate responses in advance. In effect, the plan is a
vehicle for identifying resources that can be
brought to bear in a crisis situation and for estab‐
lishing a task force framework so that those re‐
sources can be efficiently and effectively assem‐
bled, when needed. The plan can not and should
not be relied upon as a comprehensive or exhaus‐
tive reference for all potential actions, scenarios
or responses.
A. RESPONSIBILITIES
No agency currently has specific responsibility
for maintaining this plan, although it is logically
within the purview of both the Maine Emergency
Management Agency and the Governor’s Office
of Energy Independence and Security, with infor‐
mational assistance from the member agencies of
the Energy Resources Council. It is anticipated
that plan updates will be a cooperative effort as
was development of this plan.

♦

MEMA is responsible for the maintenance of
the State Emergency Operations Plan.
♦ Individual agencies are responsible for vari‐
ous existing programs and protocols refer‐
enced in this plan.
♦ The ETF should be activated at least every
two years to evaluate the currency of the Plan
and the resources it references, and to assist
with updates.
B. DEFICIENCIES
There may be deficiencies noted in this plan. All
deficiencies noted should be reported to MEMA
and communicated to the staff of the Energy Re‐
sources Council. If MEMA deems the deficien‐
cies sufficiently significant, MEMA or the Energy
Resources Council will request that the ETF be
mobilized to address the deficiencies.
C. UPDATE AND REVISION PROCEDURES
Comments on this plan will be received at all
times. Any comment or question should be di‐
rected to OEIS and MEMA and copied to Energy
Resources Council staff. Suggestions are wel‐
comed and will be carefully considered in the
preparation of future amendments.

To improve Maine’s energy emergency prepar‐ electric and natural gas transmission and distri‐
edness, several areas for potential improvement bution systems that can be used for reference at
have been identified:
the State Emergency Operations Center.
2.
Access to information on private sector
1.
GIS information. There is an incomplete preparedness. For some types of energy facili‐
GIS data set for key energy infrastructure in
ties, there is little or no access to security plans
Maine and for regional infrastructure on which by emergency officials. Security planning is left
Maine depends. The OEIS will work in conjunc‐ to industry discretion and State government ac‐
tion with the PUC, MEMA, Maine Oil Dealers,
cess to information will continue to depend on
to build this information over time. The PUC
trust and goodwill.
maintains current, detailed GIS data on Maine’s
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IX. POTENTIAL ISSUES AND ACTIONS
To improve Maine’s energy emergency prepared‐ to undertake periodic training drills based on
mock energy emergencies. Maine‐specific exer‐
ness, several areas for potential improvement
cises on several levels have proven very helpful
have been identified:
in the past. Such drills might also identify poten‐
tial areas for improvement in this plan. Federal
1.
GIS information. There is an incomplete
grant funds may be available for energy emer‐
GIS data set for key energy infrastructure in
Maine and for regional infrastructure on which
gency training sessions.
Maine depends. The OEIS will work in conjunc‐ 5.
Periodic preparedness meetings. Potential
tion with the PUC, MEMA, Maine Oil Dealers, to ETF members might benefit from periodic educa‐
build this information over time. The PUC main‐ tional meetings to discuss Maine’s various en‐
tains current, detailed GIS data on Maine’s elec‐ ergy resources and potential vulnerabilities.
tric and natural gas transmission and distribution Meetings could include both public and private
systems that can be used for reference at the State sector participants and would be valuable for
sharing information, identifying potential haz‐
Emergency Operations Center.
2.
Access to information on private sector
ards and updating contacts.
preparedness. For some types of energy facilities, 6.
Liquid Fuels Energy security. Strategies to
there is little or no access to security plans by
reduce the risks of energy emergencies include
promotion of energy efficiency and fuel diversity
emergency officials. Security planning is left to
industry discretion and State government access in addition to at least a couple of other categories
including; security of critical infrastructure and
to information will continue to depend on trust
improved insurance of local supply availability.
and goodwill.
For liquid fuels the Homeland Security Council is
3.
Natural gas emergency preparedness.
Given increasing federal concern about emer‐
the oversight body for looking at physical secu‐
gency preparedness related to natural gas infra‐ rity infrastructure issues and the State Planning
structure reconstruction and fuel allocation, it
Office/Office of Energy Independence and Secu‐
may be beneficial to consider the extent of State
rity is responsible for monitoring heating fuel
authority and whether sufficient authorities exist supplies.
to address emergency situations that emerge.
7.
Propane Supply Assurance. Require legis‐
4.
Training drills. Because potential energy
lation mandating bi‐weekly propane supply re‐
task force members will change periodically and ports to the State Planning Office just like other
there is a learning curve with energy emergency liquid fuels.
preparedness and response, it may be beneficial
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X. AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES
The following section lists applicable state and
federal authorities that may be used or guide a
response during an energy emergency. In addi‐
tion to these state and federal authorities, indi‐
vidual state and federal agencies may also have
the authority or be given the authority to waive
certain rules and regulations during an energy
emergency.
A. STATE REFERENCES
For a list of many energy‐related resources and
authorities in Maine by state agency refer to the
2003 Directory of State Energy Programs and Re‐
sources at www.maineenergyinfo.com/docs/
Directory.pdf. In addition, the following refer‐
ences are particularly relevant to energy emer‐
gency preparedness and response:
♦ Energy Emergency Proclamation (37 MRSA
742). The Governor has authority to proclaim
an energy emergency and, in cases of an
emergency, powers to implement or waive
certain programs, standards, priorities and
quotas.
♦ Profiteering in Necessities Act (10 MRSA
§1105). Prohibits price gouging in the event of
extreme market dislocation (e.g. during an
energy shortage.)
♦ Maine Unfair Trade Practices Act, 5 MRSA
§§205‐A‐214 )under which the Attorney Gen‐
eral must prove that the challenged pricing
was “unconscionable excessive.”
♦ An Act to Provide for the Security of Certain
Utility Information (35‐A MRSA §1311B). This
Act allows the Public Utilities Commission to
restrict access to specific information about
public utility operations that could compro‐
mise the security of public utility systems and
to release that information to other State agen‐
cies for use in emergency preparedness or re‐
sponse, law enforcement and other public
health and safety activities.

♦

Maine Monopolies and Profiteering Law, (10
MRSA §§1101‐1109) prohibits abuse of mo‐
nopoly power, price fixing and other unrea‐
sonable restraints of trade, among other
things.

B. FEDERAL REFERENCES
♦ Defense Production Act (1950) – The Presi‐
dent has broad authority to allocate materials
(including petroleum) and facilities as neces‐
sary and appropriate to national defense.
♦ Energy Policy and Conservation Act (P.L. 94‐
163, 1975) – The President has authority to
place limits on exports of energy supplies and
to increase production rates from wells on
federal lands and (subject to conditions) on
state lands.
♦ Executive Order 12656 (1975) – The order as‐
signs US DOE with major responsibilities for
policy making and a coordinating role within
the federal government for energy emergency
preparedness and strategy.
♦ Export Administration Act (EAA, 1979) – Ex‐
port controls may be placed on petroleum
products to protect national resources or to
further foreign policy interests.
♦ State Energy Efficiency Programs Improve‐
ment Act (1990) – The Act amends the Energy
Policy Act of 1975 to require states receiving
federal assistance to submit an energy emer‐
gency planning program to the Secretary of
Energy. It also increases the SPR to one mil‐
lion barrels.
♦ U.S.‐Canadian Free Trade Agreement (1988) –
The agreement eliminates many restrictions
on trade between the United States and Can‐
ada. Among other things, Canada agreed not
to limit exports of natural gas to the U.S. in a
crisis, except when Canadian consumers
would be curtailed.
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X. AUTHORITIES
AND REFERENCES
(CONTINUED)

♦
♦
♦
♦
♦

In addition, the following
federal regulations may be
relevant in some situations:
♦ Facility Response Plans
(marine transportation) (59 FR 34070).
Facility Response Plans for Pipelines (62 FR
13991).
Escorts for Certain Tankers (59 FR 42962).
Establishment of Double Hull Requirements
for Tank Vessels (60 FR 13318).
Facility Response Plans for Marine and Non‐
Marine Transportation Facilities (61 FR 7890).
National Contingency Plan Revisions (59 FR
47384).
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NOTES
1. Technical Assistance Briefs: Utility and Network Interdependencies: What State Regulators Need to Know, April
2005, prepared for NARUC by the Institute of Public Utilities
2. Including; promotion of flex‐time work scheduling, telecommuting, teleconferencing, carpooling, vanpooling, use of
mass transit and public transportation systems to minimize travel, enforcement of highway speed limits, encouragement
of reductions in propane fueled space heating and non‐essential industrial processes requiring either propane, diesel,
fuel oil or other liquid fuel. Assist low income customers in getting emergency supplies and work with industry associa‐
tions to get support for proposed measures to reduce demand.
3. By facilitating the movement of petroleum products to areas where they are essential to health and welfare either by
granting federal and state driver waivers on deliveries of petroleum products or coordinating with state highway and
police units. Act as a liaison among industry and terminal operators to facilitate communications and verify requests for
assistance, reduce demand at state‐owned facilities, request waivers from EPA for import and use of motor gasoline that
does not meet local air quality requirements and work through DOE to obtain Jones Act waivers for import of petroleum
products on non‐US flag vessels.
4. Declare a State of Emergency that allows implementation of mandatory measures such as allocation in a fair and
equitable way. This can be done by allocating supplies as a percentage of contractual volumes or based on prior years
actual purchases. Suppliers should not be able to discriminate within a class of accounts to give priority to one user over
another. It may be necessary to employ provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, establish a priority end‐user pro‐
gram or if supplies will be disrupted for months, a state set‐aside program may be implemented.
5. Maine Whole House Energy Efficiency Program Implementation Plan, OEIS/SPO, Feb.2006, page 7
6. Maine Whole House Energy Efficiency Program Implementation Plan, OEIS/SPO, Feb.2006, page 7
7. Customers who have contracted for interruptible gas service allow the LDC to cut their supply in times of high de‐
mand. These interruptible arrangements, which provide significant financial incentives or lower prices, usually require
advance notice of interruption and limit the total number of hours in a year that service can be interrupted. Interruptible
customers must have fuel switching capability, usually to either #2 distillate fuel oil or LPG. Approximately 10% of
Maine’s installed capacity is dual‐fuel compared to dual‐fuel capacity of 18% in New England.
8. This is a last resort measure to avoid loss of pressure to the entire system. Because of the extensive effort required to
restore service and relight all customer pilot lights, this measure is rarely implemented. Which customers are cut‐off is
determined by the configuration of the gas network and on customer priorities. Every effort is made to maintain service
to residential customers and special facilities (hospitals) and to impose cutoffs on lower priority customers. The configu‐
ration of a gas system sometimes causes customers at the end of radial pipelines to lose service first, independent of their
priority status. Generally, customers interrupted by the imposition of this measure do not receive compensation.
State Energy Assurance Guidelines, NASEO/NARUC, Version 2, November 2005
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Appendix A
Governor’s Emergency Powers
Energy Emergency Declaration
Maine law gives the Governor broad powers for managing an energy emergency. Title 37-B
MRSA §742 allows the Governor to take action after finding that an "actual or impending acute
shortage of usable energy resources threatens the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of the
state". By declaring an energy emergency in any or all regions of the state, the Governor can:
(1) Establish and implement programs, controls, standards, priorities and quotas for the
allocation, conservation and consumption of energy resources;
(2) Regulate the hours and days during which non-residential buildings may be open and the
temperatures at which they may be maintained;
(3)

Regulate the use of gasoline and diesel-powered land vehicles, watercraft and aircraft;

(4) After consulting, when appropriate, with the New England Governors, and upon the
recommendations of the Maine Public Utilities Commission, regulate the generation, distribution
and consumption of electricity; [see AG memo in Appendix B below]
(5)

Establish temporary State and local boards and agencies;

(6) Establish and implement programs and agreements for the purpose of coordinating the
emergency energy response of the State with those of the Federal government and of other states
and localities;
(7) Temporarily suspend truck weight and size regulations, but not in conflict with Federal
regulations;
(8)

Regulate the storage, distribution and consumption of heating oil.

All regulations issued by the Governor will remain in effect for ninety days. "In the event that any
order, rule or regulation issued by the Governor is to be in effect for longer than 90 days the
Governor shall, before the 80th day following [its issuance], convene the Legislature." (37-B
MRSA§ 742.)
Emergency Declaration (non-emergency-specific)
Title 37-B MRSA §742 allows the Governor to declare a state of emergency “Whenever a
disaster or civil emergency exists or appears imminent”. Such declaration will “activate the
emergency preparedness plans applicable to the affected areas and shall be the authority for the
deployment and use of any forces or resources to which the plan or plans apply”. Under a state of
emergency, the Governor may:
(1) Suspend the enforcement of any statute prescribing the procedures for conduct of state
business, or the orders or rules of any state agency, if strict compliance with the provisions of the
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statute, order or rule would in any way prevent, hinder or delay necessary action in coping with
the emergency;
(2) Utilize all available resources of the State Government and of each political subdivision
of the State as reasonably necessary to cope with the disaster emergency;
(3) Transfer the direction, personnel or functions of state departments and agencies, or units
thereof, for the purposes of performing or facilitating emergency services;
(4) Authorize the obtaining and acquisition of property, supplies and materials pursuant to
section 821;
(5) Enlist the aid of any person to assist in the effort to control, put out or end the emergency
or aid in the caring for the safety of persons;
(6) Direct and compel the evacuation of all or part of the population from any stricken or
threatened area within the State if necessary for the preservation of life or other disaster
mitigation, response or recovery;
(7) Prescribe routes, modes of transportation and destinations in connection with
evacuations;
(8) Control ingress and egress to and from a disaster area, the movement of persons within
the area and the occupancy of premises therein;
(9) Suspend or limit the sale, dispensing or transportation of alcoholic beverages, firearms,
explosives and combustibles;
(10)

Make provision for the availability and use of temporary emergency housing;

(11) Order the termination, temporary or permanent, of any process, operation, machine or
device which may be causing or is understood to be the cause of the state of emergency for which
this proclamation was made; and
(12) Take whatever action is necessary to abate, clean up or mitigate whatever danger may
exist within the affected area.
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Appendix B
Potential Limits on State Authority
Memo from the AG’s Office March 30, 2007
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OFFICE OF THE
ATTORNEY
GENERAL

Consumer Protection Division

Phone: 626-8854

6 Sate House Station

FAX: 624-7730

Augusta, Maine 04333-0006

email: francis.ackerman@Maine.gov

Memorandum
To:

Betsy Elder, Office of Energy Independence & Security
From:

Francis Ackerman, Assistant Attorney General

Pc:

Linda Conti, Chief, Consumer Protection
Kathi Peters, Research Assistant

Date:

March 30, 2007

Subject: Limitations on state remedial powers in energy emergency

In the context of your compilation of a draft revised Energy Emergency Plan for
the State, you have asked that I address the scope of and limitations on the remedial
powers available to the State in an energy emergency. This memorandum responds to
your request.
Proclamation of energy emergency. An “energy emergency” is defined by law
as “an actual or impending shortage in energy resources” that “threatens the health, safety
or welfare of citizens.” When such an emergency arises, the Governor is required to
issue a proclamation declaring its existence in the State or any section of the State. Upon
issuance of the proclamation, the Governor may exercise the emergency powers
enumerated in 37-B MRSA sec. 742 (2) (B).
At least two of the powers listed in the cited provision are subject to limitations
affecting the scope of the Governor’s remedial options.
Limitation on emergency electricity regulation. In particular, the Governor’s
ability to “regulate the generation, distribution and consumption of electricity”
(subsection [4] of the cited provision) is circumscribed by the preemptive effect of the
Federal Power Act, 16 USC sec. 824 et seq., which reserves the power to regulate
generation facilities in interstate commerce to the FERC. FERC jurisdiction does not,
however, extend to facilities that produce power solely for the intrastate market. 16 USC
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sec. 824 (b) (1).
In practice, this means that the Governor’s regulatory power under the statute
would extend only to facilities not connected to the New England grid. This would
include: (a) facilities in northern Maine (which is not currently connected to the New
England grid except indirectly through New Brunswick; (b) private facilities not
connected to the New England grid; and (c) facilities situated on any portion of the grid
that becomes temporarily disconnected from the New England grid.
Limitation on emergency regulation of home heating oil storage, distribution.
A similar analysis applies with respect to the Governor’s power to regulate the storage
and distribution of home heating oil (subsection [8] of sec. 742 [2] [B]). Here, the limits
are set by the dormant Commerce Clause, which has been interpreted to confer the power
to regulate interstate commerce exclusively upon Congress. Under this doctrine, the
Governor may not validly regulate the storage or distribution of home heating oil in the
stream of interstate commerce, i.e., when it is destined for interstate shipment. See, e.g.,
Ben Oehrleins & Sons & Daughter v. Hennepin County, 115 F3rd 1372 (8th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 522 US 1029 (1997). However, he may validly regulate storage and
distribution that is confined to the State, and does not accommodate or displace product
destined for out-of-state shipment.
Price controls as a remedial option. Under existing law, the Governor does not
possess the power to address price spikes or volatility in petroleum markets by imposing
price controls. Without discussing either the need or the advisability of endowing the
State’s chief executive with this power, I pause only to note that if such a power were
provided, it would be subject to the same limitations discussed above.
Applicability of antitrust provisions. Although energy prices in Maine, as
elsewhere in the United States, are generally unregulated, this does not mean that
anything goes in the State’s energy markets. The Attorney General possesses the ability
to initiate enforcement action against any party engaging in collusive price-fixing, market
allocation or any other “unreasonable restraint of trade.” He may also prosecute a party
possessing monopoly or quasi-monopoly market power for abuse of that power, or for
oppressive or exclusionary practices. 10 MRSA sec. 1101, 1102. These provisions apply
regardless of whether an emergency exists.
Profiteering or price-gouging provisions. Finally, under the newly refurbished
Profiteering in Necessities law, 10 MRSA sec 1105, the Governor may determine that a
natural catastrophe or man-made event has interrupted the operation of normal
competitive forces in a given market, causing an “abnormal market disruption”. If the
Governor proceeds to issue a declaration to this effect, the Attorney General may initiate
appropriate enforcement.
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Maine’s profiteering law allows the Attorney General to prosecute so-called
“price-gouging” only when (a) the Governor has declared an abnormal market disruption;
and (b) the price of an affected good or service has increased by at least 15% over the
sum of the prior price and any increased costs. Accordingly, it is important for the
Governor and the Attorney General to remain in close contact and to coordinate decisionmaking under the profiteering law in an incipient energy emergency
AG as market monitor. Finally, regardless of whether an emergency exists, the
Attorney General plays a role as monitor of home heating oil and motor fuel markets
under the Petroleum Market Share Act, 10 MRSA sec. 1671 et seq. This requires him to
remain in contact with market participants to ensure that he receives current information.
As a result of this monitoring function, the Attorney General can help maintain lines of
communication between the public and private sectors, while continuing to fulfill his
constitutional role as the State’s chief law enforcement officer.
Please let me know if you have any further questions.
FA/zap
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Appendix C
Energy Information References
ENERGY TYPE
Energy – all types

SOURCE

WEBSITE

PHONE

DATA

U.S. Department of Energy
Information Administration

www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/states/s
tates

202-586-8800

Primary energy use

Energy Resources Council
Energy Information Website

www.maineenergyinfo.com/res
ourcesouncil
www.maineenergyinfo.com

207-775-6728

Links to State, federal
and industry websites
with energy information
relevant to Maine

ISO New England

www.iso-ne.com

413-535-4069

Maine Public Utilities
Commission

www.maine.gov/mpuc

207-287-3831

Northern Maine Independent
System Administrator
Independent Energy
Producers of Maine

www.nmisa.com

207-992-4724

Transmission system
and market operations,
regional generating
facilities
Electricity and gas
prices, GIS information,
utility emergency plans,
infrastructure data and
maps, and contact
information for key
facilities
Operations and outage
information
Maine independent
power plants capacity
and operating status

American Gas Association
Northeast Gas Association

www.aga.org
www.northeastgas.org

202-824-7000
781-455-6800

National data
Regional system data
including consumption
by state and sector
Comment [C1]: Why is MPUC listed

Maine Public Utilities
Commission

www.maine.gov/mpuc

207-287-3831

Regulates in-statenatural gas resource?
natural gas distribution.

American Automobile
Association
American Petroleum Institute
Maine Oil Dealers
Association
Office of Energy
Independence and Security

www.aaa.com

800-222-3395

Transportation fuel
prices

www.api.com
www.meoil.com

207-622-5881
207-729-5298

www.maineenergyinfo.com

207-287-8927

State Planning Office

www.maine.gov/spo

207-287-8927

Census data

202-624-8450

Federal policy
developments

Electricity

207-626-0730

Natural Gas

as an electricity resource but not a

Petroleum/Fuels

Market and dealer
information
Heating fuels inventory
and prices (annual
overview), heating fuel
prices (weekly),
petroleum industry
contacts

State Demographics

State and Regional
Energy Officials
Coalition of Northeast
Governors
National Association of
Regulatory Utility
Commissioners

www.naruc.org

202-898-2200
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National Association of State
Energy Officials
New England Conference of
Public Utility Commissioners
New England Governors
Conference

www.naseo.org

703-299-8800

www.necpuc.org

603-229-0308

www.negc.org

617-423-6900

Weekly conference
calls on security issues
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Appendix D
Public Information Resources
Timely, accurate information on an energy situation can help prevent confusion and uncertainty,
as well as encourage the support and cooperation of others.
Ongoing Options
Maine Energy Information Website. The web site, located on the Internet at
www.maineenergyinfo.com
contains indexed topical energy information, conservation tips and links to other energy-related
information. The site is maintained by the Governor’s Office of Energy Independence and
Security (OEIS).
Keep ME Warm (part of the Volunteer Maine Website). The web site, located on the Internet at
http://www.volunteermaine.org/keepmewarm/index.php provides information on Maine’s home
heating oil assistance program and provides opportunities for people to volunteer time and
resources to help keep their neighbors warm as home heating prices escalate.
HEAT TIPS Help Line. A toll-free telephone line, 866-HEAT TIP, is operated by the Department
of Economic and Community Development (DECD). DECD staff can offer technical assistance
in weatherization and conservation techniques. They also disseminate the same type of
conservation and assistance information offered by the web site. The help line design allows for
the line to be forwarded to the State Emergency Operations Center Help Line (8 lines
concurrently available) if the need for multiple operators is identified.
MEMA Press Release Library. MEMA maintains a library of press releases on safety issues
relating to all hazards. Included are such energy-related subjects as winter weather safety,
generator safety, etc. This information is available online at www.maineprepares.com and can
also be customized to current need and disseminated quickly to media outlets as needed.
Event- or Time Period-Specific Resources
Special Public Service Announcements. PSAs featuring the Governor with a conservation
message for radio and television were developed in 2000, 2004 and 2005 and can be updated as
needed or serve as a template for future PSAs.
Special Newspaper Inserts. In 2000, a special newspaper insert was produced in concert with
several state agencies and private industry and inserted in daily newspapers statewide. The insert
included articles on conservation, weatherization and safety. This publication serves as a template
for future such efforts.
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Appendix E
Actions Taken or Suggested in the Past either Prior or Subsequent to a
Governor’s Declaration of Energy Emergency
Overview
Many actions may be taken without declaration of an energy emergency. If these actions and
voluntary compliance of energy conservation measures do not alleviate the effects of the shortage
and ensure the maintenance of essential services, and if the fuel supply crisis threatens to be both
severe and prolonged, the Governor may declare an Energy Emergency (37-B MRSA 7-12) in
order to assume emergency powers granted in the Civil Emergency Preparedness Act (37-B
MRSA Chapter 13).
The Governor will specify in his proclamation what areas of the State are affected by the state of
emergency. Mandatory measures declared under the Governor's emergency powers will be
enforced by the Department of Public Safety.
Contingency measures outlined below are intended to encourage conservation and to reduce
demand, prevent hoarding practices by consumers and to meet the needs of priority users during
an energy crisis.
Any measures implemented with regard to transportation fuel should be coordinated, to the extent
possible, with all of the New England states and the Eastern Canadian provinces in order to
facilitate travel within the region.
Previous administrations have examined potential measures to be taken with and without
declaration of an energy emergency. The current administration is reviewing and adding to this
library of potential actions. Details of these measures, as well as previously suggested text of
Governor’s messages, are on file with the Maine Emergency Management Agency.
Potential Measures without an Emergency Declaration:
All energy resource types:

y

Public information program

y

Call for voluntary conservation
Transportation Fuels:

y

Voluntary Retail Service Station Flag System

y

Voluntary Demand Management Measures

y

Voluntary Rideshare Efforts

y

Increased Speed Limit Enforcement

y

Speed Limit Reductions
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y

Reduction of Trucking Operations

Heating Fuels:

y

Close Non-Essential State Buildings

y

Adjust thermostats to reduce demand

y

Institute Compressed Work Week for State Employees

y

Voluntary work week and building restrictions by business and industry

y

Open Temporary Shelters 1

y

Encourage the Use of Pour Point Additives
Propane (non-heating use):

y

Voluntary Restriction of the Use of Propane for Cooking

y

Voluntary Restrictions of the Use of Propane Clothes Dryers

y

Voluntary Restriction of the Use of Propane Vehicles
Electricity:

y

Calls for voluntary conservation
Potential Measures under an Emergency Declaration:
Vehicle fuels:

y

Mandatory Minimum Fuel Purchase Restriction

y

Odd-Even Sales System

y

Mandatory Retail Service Station Flag and Operating, Hours Measure

y

Suspend Truck Weight and Size Regulations

y

Priority End User Plan

y

Allocation of transportation fuels.
Heating Oil, Kerosene, Propane and Natural Gas:

y

Sales to Non-Priority Users

y

Allocation of Heating Fuels

1

Although the potential opening of emergency shelters is referenced in previous versions of this plan, this
action has never been taken in past energy crises, and is not considered likely by emergency managers.
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Appendix F
Petroleum Reserves
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is an emergency supply of crude oil stored at four sites
near the Gulf Coast in underground salt caverns. Established in the aftermath of the 1973-74 oil
embargo, the SPR provides the President with a powerful response option should a disruption
occur in commercial oil supplies threaten the US economy. In February 1999 the Clinton
Administration announced a new plan to resume fill of the SPR with federal royalty oil from
production in the Central Gulf of Mexico. The initiative was designed to replace approximately
28 million barrels of oil which were sold from the Reserve in fiscal years 1996 and 1997 largely
for deficit reduction purposes. Royalty oil is owed to the U.S. government by operators who
acquire leases on the federally-owned Outer Continental Shelf. Under current law, federal
ownership ranges from 12.5% to 16.7% of the oil produced from federal leases. The Minerals
Management Service (MMS) is responsible for collecting royalties from federal oil and gas leases
in cash, but in 1998 it started testing the effectiveness of collecting royalties ‘in-kind’ that is
acquiring the crude oil itself. This mechanism was adopted to begin refilling the SPR.
In May 2001 the Bush Administration released its National Energy Policy endorsing the addition
of oil to the SPR using the ‘royalty in-kind’ program and in November 2001 President Bush
announced his intent to fill the Reserve to 700 million barrels. On several occasions, the Energy
Department has agreed to reschedule incoming oil shipments to the Reserve, at the request of
contractors, deferring the deliveries for several months to a year or more. In these instances,
companies under contract to deliver crude oil to the Federal Government agree to increase the
volume of oil delivered to the Reserve at the later date at no additional cost to the taxpayer.
The recently enacted Energy Policy Act of 2005 directs the Secretary of Energy to fill the SPR to
its authorized 1 billion barrel capacity. This will require the Department of Energy to complete
proceedings to select sites necessary to expand the capacity of the SPR to 1 billion barrels. For
more current information, see www.fe.doe.gov

Northeast Regional Home Heating Oil Reserve
On July 20, 2000 President Clinton directed Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson to establish a
home heating oil component of the SPR in the Northeast to help protect the region from possible
fuel shortages. The US is now storing 2 million barrels of heating oil in the reserve which is
intended to provide emergency relief from weather-related shortages for approximately 10 days.
This is the time needed for ships to bring heating oil from the Gulf of Mexico into New York
Harbor and from suppliers in Venezuela and Canada to bring oil into New England.
Although heating oil shortages never materialized during the 2000-01 winter, the existence of the
Northeast Home Heating Oil Reserve (NEHHOR) provided an important safety cushion for
millions of Americans. Recognizing this, Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham formally notified
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Congress on March 6, 2001 that the Bush Administration would establish the Reserve as a
permanent part of America’s energy readiness effort. On August 6, 2001 the Energy Department
announced their approval of relocating 250,000 barrels of the NEHHOR to the Motiva terminal in
Providence, RI. Accordingly, Secretary Abraham issued a statement. “Stockpiling a portion of
our heating oil inventory in Providence gives us a third geographic location from which we can
distribute fuel to homeowners and businesses in the event of a supply shortage. Providence is
especially advantageous because it extends our distribution capabilities into the Boston area and
gives us additional truck and marine loading options.” It is unclear, however, if the NEHHOR
would be available to Maine during an emergency, due in large part to Jones Act restrictions.
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Appendix G
ISO New England Emergency Procedures
Current ISO-NE operating procedures, with excerpts summarized below, can be found at
http://www.iso-ne.com/rules_proceds/operating/isone/index.html.

Operating Procedure No. 4 (OP 4)
The ISO-NE has a formal, detailed plan to address electricity emergencies. This plan is referred
to as Operating Procedure No. 4 (OP4) or “Action during a Capacity Deficiency”. These actions
are implemented when operating reserves fall below required levels to give grid operators time to
respond to a variety of circumstances and conditions. The OP4 is a series of 16 independent
actions to increase supply or decrease demand to address a capacity deficiency. These actions can
be applied to the system as a whole, throughout New England, or on a sub-regional scale to
address region-specific shortfalls.
The steps are as follows:
Actions 1- 9
•

Interrupt electricity load that is under contract for interruption

•

Purchase emergency contracts for short-term electricity demand from other
jurisdictions

•

Call for voluntary conservation measures from the public, known as Power Watch
Actions 10-14

•

Move the 30 minute reserve capacity requirement to zero to allow more resources to
be called into use

•

Call for voltage reductions
Actions 15-16

•

Radio and TV appeals through a Power Warning Appeal that in extreme conditions
can involve an ISO-NE request for personal reinforcement of the message by state governors

OP 7
An additional Operating Procedure that addresses a major problem with the reliability of the
electric grid is Operating Procedure Number 7 (OP 7), Action in an Emergency. This is used to
thwart a total collapse of the system. This procedure involves a temporary disconnection of
blocks of customers to reduce overall demand. This action is commonly referred to as “rolling
blackouts” or “rotating feeders”, and would involve controlled power outages that would last a
few hours for any block of customers. OP 7 may occur either automatically or managed by
system operators.
OP 6
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In the event that actions of OP 4 and OP 7 are not sufficient to maintain the integrity of the
regional bulk electric system, or a significant portion thereof, or that system becomes
substantially unstable, the system may shut down, either automatically or managed by system
operators. Restoration of power to the collapsed system over the succeeding hours and days will
be accomplished through procedures in ISO-NE OP 6, System Restoration.

Event Communications Plan
Throughout energy emergencies, ISO New England conducts routine briefings with government
officials, provides real time communications of public advisories and stresses the importance of
conservation as the first step in emergency response. They use all communications available
including TV, radio, and web-site postings.

55

Appendix H

Case Study
Summary of Propane Perfect Storm 2007

56

Case Study; Summary of Propane Perfect Storm 2007
In winter of 2007, a perfect storm of factors contributed to a propane shortage in Maine. A
summary of this situation is instructive in recognizing some of Maine’s vulnerabilities with
respect to propane. On February 10th, over 2,800 Canadian conductors and yard workers went on
strike delaying shipments of coal, grain, car parts, lumber, energy supplies and other cargo at
Canada’s largest port. Maine Governor Baldacci declared a state of emergency on February 13th
in order to waive the hours of service rules for transport and delivery of propane. After a
significant February 14th snowstorm which dropped two feet of snow in Maine and over three to
four feet in Canada, the Governor in coordination with the Maine Oil Dealers Association, issued
a press release informing the public about the propane delivery problem and recommending the
incorporation of conservation measures. On February 16th the Governor sent a letter to President
Bush informing him of the situation and seeking assistance in pressuring the Canadian
government to intervene in the rail strike that, along with bad weather, was crippling the ability of
oil dealers to supply Maine with propane. Meanwhile, the Maine Office of Energy Independence
and Security was getting many calls from non-heating commercial and industrial customers
stating they had been cut off by their suppliers for non-essential propane deliveries. The Governor
called an emergency meeting of the ERT on February 19th and was advised by an informal energy
task force (ETF) composed of Energy Resource Council members, as well as many other agents
of the liquid fuels industry.
Surrounding New England states and New York were experiencing tight supplies but reported no
allocations like Maine. Rough seas delayed the arrival of ships in Newington, NH and
Providence, RI during some of the coldest weather of the winter at a time when energy demand
across the region was higher than normal. Supplies of propane continued to dwindle at other New
England terminals, particularly Sea-3, a port terminal in Portsmouth, NH. Sea-3 was on 50%
allocation and had received product on February 15th.
Just when it appeared the situation couldn’t get any worse, a pipeline rupture temporarily
disrupted supplies to a terminal in Selkirk, NY which serves as an alternative source for Maine’s
propane needs. TEPPCO, a large propane pipeline which brings shipments from the Gulf Coast to
terminals in the northeast, declared Force Majeure on propane deliveries east of Todhunter, Ohio,
after detecting a leak at its Seymour, Indiana location on February 20th. TEPPCO began repairs
on its broken valve and opened up again a few days later on, February 23rd, but long lines at
Selkirk were the result. Propane inventories declined in New England during the week of
February 23rd by 73% as the rail strike in Canada and the outage of the TEPPCO pipeline
drastically reduced propane deliveries.
According to authorities, the next Algerian waterborne shipment was not due to arrive at Sea-3
for three weeks or until March 6th. The Providence, R.I. terminal had no propane supplies and was
expecting a shipment to arrive on February 24th. Portsmouth, NH Sea-3 LPG waterborne
deliveries were still in a state of delay as of March 7th and then again on March 11th due to bad
weather at sea. Projections were recalibrated for ship deliveries significantly impacting dealer
expectations. Concerned with meeting contractual obligations, some Maine dealers were forced to
drive truckloads of product from Connecticut, driving Maine propane prices up.
During this three-week re-supply gap, Maine railroad officials worked with Canadian National to
retrieve propane rail cars in Montreal and put them in priority for delivery to Maine. The rail
terminal in Auburn, which typically receives 40 propane cars a week during winter (each carrying
30,000 gallons) received only 15 railroad cars during the week of February 23rd. Also,
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Department of Homeland Security Customs and Border Protection worked with border officials
to expedite deliveries into Maine by temporarily streamlining border crossing procedures.
Throughout this mid-February to mid-March period, the Maine Emergency Management Agency
(MEMA) coordinated all propane supply activities in the State. Governor Baldacci, MEMA,
Maine Department of Transportation, Maine Office of Energy Independence and Security and
other Maine government officials were in contact with businesses, propane distributors, CEOs of
propane distribution companies, the Canadian government, Northeast utilities or government
organizations, federal government agencies and neighboring states. Arrangements for incremental
supplies of propane to be delivered to Maine were made so that companies could meet their
obligations to primary heating customers. Maine recommended conservation measures for
propane customers. Some Maine propane dealers put their non-essential commercial customers
on allocation causing many of these businesses to suffer economic hardship.
On February 20th, after the Canadian Industrial Relations Board refused to rule the strike illegal, a
federal mediator was brought in and on February 26th a tentative agreement to end the strike
against Canada’s largest railroad was achieved. Striking conductors and yard-service staff went
back to work and railcars finally began to move and be spotted which means the car has been
hitched, processed and is moving towards its destination. There was some concern that empty
cars be sent back through Sarnia to avoid the strike zone. Distributors were projecting a steady
flow of railcars with product but as of March 1st allocations from the Duke terminal in Auburn
were still not consistent or adequate to meet demand. Railcars were arriving periodically but not
with the necessary frequency to meet demand. Although the strike had ended, it took weeks for
supplies to arrive in Maine and the state of emergency was extended until 3/15/07 to allow the
waiving of truck drivers delivery hour limits. Fast pass requirements at the border were extended
to allow Canadian drivers quicker access to both sides of the border.
No Mainers went without heat during the four week crisis, but Maine propane dealers had to take
serious steps to control their inventories by either making partial deliveries or skipping homes
whose tanks were more than half full. In some instances, dealers looked to competitors to provide
enough propane to at least make partial deliveries to essential or critical need heating customers.
Due to prolonged delays in railcar deliveries, some companies were rationing supplies and sent
trucks as far away as Providence to get product. All dealers had to absorb the cost of redoubling
delivery to get some customers back to normal or pre-rationing levels. When it was all over, some
propane distribution companies were investigating expanding their supply options while other
dealers wanted to expand their storage capabilities. The pro-pane crisis came at a time when TV
ads created by the Propane Education and Research Council were promoting the use of propane
as a flexible fuel for water heaters, cook-stoves, clothes-dryers and furnaces.
Lessons learned from this perfect storm of events include: the need to have information and
communication protocols, good information on propane supply movements, inventory patterns,
storage and consumption. The increased demand for propane by the industrial and commercial
sectors must be better understood, tracked and documented. Maine needs a better understanding
of its capacity to convert to dual-fuel capacity for natural gas and propane. The State needs to
establish better personal business relationships and connections with the Northeast Propane
Associations and the CEOs of propane distribution companies as these were the most helpful and
valuable players in finding beneficial solutions to propane supply problems. These relationships
proved to be most valuable to Maine in its time of need.
Additionally, in hindsight it has been acknowledged that Maine could benefit from having a realtime freight monitoring system for ease in tracking the movements of fuels in and out of the State
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of Maine, Canada and New England. Maine State government needs to increase the
comprehensiveness of its understanding of propane infrastructure, key players and their contact
information. Maine State government needs to improve the communication it has with propane
distributors and suppliers and institute a protocol similar to that which exists with #2 heating oil
waterborne terminal operators. And it may be necessary to enact legislation mandating bi-weekly
reporting of propane inventories to the state by propane distributors as with other fuels.

Appendix I
TEPPCO Pipeline Map
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Appendix J
Border Crossing Maps for Railroads
transporting in and out of Maine
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Appendix K.
MDOT Rail and Freight System Maps
2007
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Appendix L
Maine Primary Terminal Operators
Contact Directory
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Primary Terminal Operators/ Contacts Directory
Betsy Elder 1/16/07
Company

Contact

Citgo/Irving Bill Sousa (operator)
No longerMotiva
Kevin Herrington (assistant operator)
(Irving 55%
102 Mechanic St., South Portland, Me.04106
and 45% Citgo Telephone -799-3394 Fax 799-0319

Terminal Locations
South Portland
Bangor

ownership

Irving

Rob Wilson- Manager IOTI in Portsmouth
(Irving Oil Terminals Inc.) 603-559-8818
190 Commerce Way, Portsmouth, N.H. 03801
Rob.wilson@irvingoil.com
Kevin Mikoski – Product Supply Analyst
Phone- 603-559-8755 FAX 603-559-8793

Gulf Oil

Mark Pennell-Terminal Manager
175 Front Street, South Portland, Me. 04106
799-5561, Fax 799-2994
David Moody (terminal supervisor) reports
(Kevin McAtee - 617-889-9031 in Chelsea)

Sprague
Portland

Searsport

South Portland

Larry Laverrierre- Terminal Manager
Lower Main Street, South Portland, Me. 04106
Mike Price- Merrill pier 799-4899, Fax 767-631827
Jim Theriault - 603-430-5372
Searsport Bucksport
Louise Payeur – reports from Sprague,
Tom Dobbins -Two International Drive,
Suite #200 Portsmouth, NH 03801

South

ExxonMobil Bart Whittmer -207-767-3251, Fax 767-3253
Portland
170 Lincoln Street, South Portland, Me. 04106
Bangor via
pipeline
Exxon Mobil-DFOC attn: Brown
3033 Irving Blvd. Dallas, Texas 75247-6212 Room 7B30
phone- 214-951-2403 FAX 214-951-2568
Webber Oil Candice M. Morrill- Product Control Coordinator

Bangor,
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Brewer,
207-942-5501 Xt. 5044
Bucksport
700 Main St., Bangor, Maine 04401 (As of 10/02 they own all storage locations)

Webber
Tanks Inc.

Curt Smith 207-469-3165 (office manager/reports)
P.O.Box CC, Bucksport, Maine

Brewer
Bucksport

(half Dead-River
/half Webber Oil)

Global Petroleum

operations.
started out as two
FPL

Bill Murphy (sales) - 207-883-9196
South Portland
Bruce Yates (Terminal Operator) 207-767-8259
(Global owns) Northeast Petroleum Terminal,
1 Clarke St. South Portland 04106 byates@globalp.com
(#2, #6 and kero heating fuels all at NEPT which is a public Co.
Throughput gasoline/diesel at Exxon Mobil or CitgoIrving
Gasoline aspect is run as a private entity. Global
brothers with a gas station in Boston

Sandy Lindenburg 207-846-8184 FAX846-8180(#6 for Wyman Station)
Mark Grover – Plant/Production Leader(reports)- Todd
667 Cousins Street, Yarmouth, Maine 04096
207-846-8189

Portland Pipeline just handles crude; contact Tom Hardison 207-767-0440/direct or 7670430
Business Services Director Dave Cyr- 767-0450
No Terminals/Thruputters- Gasoline operations
Getty
Jim Stewart -799-8518 Fax 799-8316 (27Rear Maine St., South Portland)
Catamount
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Appendix M
Propane Gas Association of New England
PGANE
P.O. Box 859
Moultonboro, NH 03254
Phone: 603-544-2226
FAX- 603-544-2228
President : Denis Gagne
Eastern Propane Gas
P.O. Box 1800
Rochester, NH. 03866-1800
dgagne@eastern.com
Sr. Vice President
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Joe Rose
Propane Plus
P.O. Box 38
Rehoboth, Mass. 02769
508-252-3359
FAX-508-252-3359
jrose@propaneplus.com
Director at Large
Matthew B. Steven Sr.
P.O. Box 18
Essex Junction, Vt. 05453
207-879-4177
FAX- 802-872-8827
mstevens1941@verizon.net
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Office, January 2003.
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June 2002.
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National Association of State Energy Officials, “Northeastern States Coordinated Energy
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New Hampshire Governor’s Office of Energy and Community Services, “New Hampshire State
Energy Emergency Response Plan”, June 2001.
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U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection, Vulnerability and Risk
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